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Abstract 
Determinants and Consequences of Corporate Governance 
Regulation – New Zealand Evidence  
 
by 
Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan 
 
This thesis contributes to the literature of corporate governance by documenting the 
association between „Comply or Explain‟ regulation and managerial opportunistic behaviour 
and firm value. Following well-publicised corporate collapses in the USA, UK, Europe and 
Australia, among others, corporate governance has been the centre of attention in the worlds 
of business and economics. This has led to increased disclosures concerning corporate 
governance as well as demands for the regulation of systems of corporate governance and 
internal controls. 
From the very beginning, the effectiveness of soft regulation (comply or explain) in New 
Zealand has been questioned.   In order to address this question, three aspects of corporate 
governance regulations; determinants of compliance, affects on managerial behaviour and 
investor response to compliance were investigated. Sample companies were drawn from those 
listed on the New Zealand Stock Market and New Zealand Alternative Market from the years 
2000 to 2007 (inclusive).  
The first part of the thesis examines the determinants of compliance with corporate 
governance regulations in New Zealand. A detailed corporate governance index was prepared 
to measure the level of compliance. Results indicate that the level of compliance is positively 
associated with the presence of corporate governance regulations. The results also show that 
listing tenure is an important factor regarding compliance with governance regulations. 
The second part of the thesis examines the effects of corporate governance compliance on 
managerial opportunistic behaviour. Using free cash flow as a measure of total accruals, a 
comparative analysis of the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model and Performance Matched 
 iv 
Accruals Model was conducted. Results show that higher compliance with corporate 
governance regulation reduces managerial opportunistic behaviour as measured by 
discretionary accruals. This suggests that the value of discretionary accruals will reduce, 
irrespective of the nature of regulations. 
The third part of the thesis examines the long term effects of corporate governance 
compliance. Using enterprise value as a measure of firm value, a comparative analysis was 
conducted with Tobin‟s Q and Price-to-Book ratios. Results show that corporate governance 
compliance has a strong positive effect on firm value. Firms having both lower discretionary 
accruals and high compliance with corporate governance regulations will lead to increased 
firm value, reflected in an increase in investor confidence. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Regulation, „Comply or Explain‟,   Corporate 
Governance Index, Free Cash Flow, Discretionary Accruals, 
Enterprise Value, Firm Value. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Rationale 
Corporate governance has received greater attention from regulators, professionals and 
academicians following a series of corporate scandals after 2002 which lead to billions of 
dollars in losses for shareholders. A series of corporate governance regulations
1
 have been 
imposed to regain investors‟ confidence in the stock market, most of which are either 
voluntary or „Comply or Explain‟ in nature except Sarbanes Oxley Act - 2002. To this end, 
The New Zealand Stock Exchange and Securities Commission issued the Corporate 
Governance Best Practice Code of 2003 and Corporate Governance: Principles and 
Guidelines of 2004 in addition to other common laws such as the Companies Act 1993. 
The effectiveness of these regulations has been questioned from the early stages of 
implementation (Rose, 2005). Farrar (2005) compares the effectiveness of the New Zealand 
corporate governance regulations with others in rather similar socio-economic environments, 
stating : 
“…New Zealand has been more dilatory and the governance environment 
is more permissive than directors would find in Canada, the United 
Kingdom, the United States or Australia. This is a paradise for directors; a 
principles-based regime with few rules to underpin it and regulators with 
little bite. (p. 72)” 
 The concept of corporate governance was generally in place before implementing the 
Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 2003 (amended in 2004) and Corporate 
Governance: Principles and Guidelines 2004 as guidelines, therefore the value addition of 
voluntary regulation becomes the concern of regulators, professionals and academicians. 
Consequently, the flexibility of firms to comply with better corporate governance practice in 
the absence of mandatory obligation raises following important research questions. What 
determines the corporate governance compliance with regulation? What are the consequences 
                                                 
1
 Regulations to encompasses mandatory regulations including non-mandatory (voluntary and „comply or 
explain‟) corporate governance guidelines and principles. 
 2 
 
of complying with corporate governance regulation on earnings management and firm value? 
These questions remain unanswered due to the very limited research on corporate governance 
regulation in New Zealand. So, the objectives of the research are as follows:  
1. To identify determinants of corporate Governance regulation compliance. 
2. To measure the effect of corporate governance on earnings management. 
3. To measure the effect of corporate governance compliance on firm value. 
Following the objectives, this research considers three specific contexts which are: 
determinants of compliance with corporate governance regulation, discretionary accruals 
using free cash flow and firm value. Six sectors, those of service, primary, goods, energy, 
property and investment are considered relevant in this study. The different determinants and 
consequences of complying with corporate governance regulations in each sector are 
investigated. 
1.2 Research Framework 
The effectiveness of corporate governance regulation in increasing management 
accountability is well established (Cadbury, 1992; Short, Keasey, Hull, & Wright, 1998). 
Conflict of interest between managers and owners could be alleviated by effective corporate 
governance practices (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). Regulatory compliance is one of the 
important factors differentiating internal or external mechanisms of corporate governance 
used to monitor managerial accountability. Corporate governance regulations could be 
categorised as either mandatory or „comply or explain2‟. Firms may not comply with 
corporate governance regulations in the absence of mandatory obligation. The „Comply or 
Explain‟ nature of corporate governance regulation gives more flexibility to firms in 
compliance. However, a single corporate governance code and principles may not suitable for 
all sectors due to the businesses‟ nature and complexity (Braithwaite, Coglianese, & Levi-
Faur, 2007; Davies & Schiltzer, 2008; Muleherin, 2005). Consequently, the first context 
identified the determinants of corporate governance compliance with regulations. 
Figure 1 shows the research framework of the thesis. Regulation is one of the major corporate 
governance mechanisms, derived due to separation of owner and management, but flexibility 
                                                 
2
 „Comply or Explain‟ means companies are expected to apply the code and explain reasons for any non-
compliance. 
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in compliance may render the mechanism ineffective. Identifying the determinants of 
corporate governance compliance with regulation is the primary exploration in this thesis. 
The existences of corporate governance regulations were considered an important 
determinant of compliance.  Additionally, firms operating for a long time and stock exchange 
listing status of long tenure indicate better compliance with regulations. Similarly, firms with 
concentrated ownership status may have increased possibility of better corporate governance 
compliance with regulations. All these determinants were included in the first context to 
address the opening objective. The consequences of better corporate governance compliance 
with regulation were evaluated in relation to those determinants. 
The second context in „Figure 1‟ elicits the short term consequences of corporate governance 
compliance on managerial opportunistic behaviour, measured via the proxy of discretionary 
accruals. Higher compliance will increase management accountability which will 
subsequently control managerial discretion. Similarly, firms having higher free cash flow 
increase the possibility of managerial discretion. 
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Figure 1: Research Framework 
 
Fundamentally, managers and shareholders have different attitudes towards the risks of 
projects (Jensen, 1983) which may create managerial discretion in decision making. 
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decisions. Managers focus on yearly performance rather than long term and adjust accounting 
numbers to meet pre-announced forecasts to achieve financial incentives. Firms with better 
corporate governance compliance reduce managerial discretion and increase quality of 
earnings. Higher earnings quality enhances investment decisions for potential shareholders 
and other market forces. Furthermore, firm growth and maturity as proxies of business 
operating tenure also impact on managerial discretion. All the determinants were included in 
this context to address the second objective. 
The third context in „figure 1‟ identifies the long term effects of higher corporate governance 
compliance with regulations on investor confidence. The fundamental objective of 
shareholders is to maximise the value of firm and this research would remain incomplete 
without addressing this issue. Corporate compliance will encourage accountability and lower 
earnings management results in effective decision-making information being given to the 
stock market for investors. Hence, investment decisions become more effective in a regulated 
corporate governance environment and increased investor confidence results in higher firm 
value. 
1.3 Institutional Environment in New Zealand 
New Zealand‟s institutional environment is significantly different from other developed 
countries. Regulation and market monitoring mechanisms are also unique in comparison with 
the USA, Canada, UK and Australia. The New Zealand Exchange (NZX) and Securities 
Commission of New Zealand have a strong desire to self-regulate because most of the 
corporate governance regulation is principle based. New Zealand has had extensive 
deregulation over the whole economy since 1984, which have changed its reputation from an 
almost socialist country to one of the more business friendly countries in the world (Walsh, 
1988). However, New Zealand business sectors are becoming more foreign owned which 
invites some criticism of the effectiveness of deregulation. 
The NZX and Securities Commission, together with other regulators, have developed 
unparalleled self regulatory models of corporate governance best practice codes and 
principles. Financial reporting standards have become more principle based and self regulated 
compared to the USA, UK and Canada. Management in New Zealand provides relatively 
more opportunity to use individual judgement and experience in decision making. In the US, 
management is under heavy pressure to meet the quarterly forecasts, whereas New Zealand 
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management is more flexible. Furthermore, US firm managers have more incentives to meet 
targets by managing earnings, while New Zealand boards are more independent from the 
companies and face no legal penalty for wrong forecasts given to shareholders (Farrar, 2005) 
and that may result in more earnings manipulation. 
Figure 2 shows that New Zealand‟s corporate governance structure is similar to the Anglo-
American model (Eldin, 2003). The ownership structure of New Zealand corporations is 
separate from the control of organization resources. Shareholders have no explicit contractual 
relationship with the management. Similarly, statutory regulations allow company boards to 
manage the business and affairs of organization, but not specific functions. Shareholders 
appoint directors in annual meetings from the proposed candidates by nomination committee. 
 
Figure 2: Corporate Governance System in New Zealand 
 
Ownership concentration in New Zealand is also different from the USA, UK and Australia. 
Concentrated ownership enables the principal shareholder to monitor managerial 
performance closely, which reduces managerial discretion in decision making. However, 
minority shareholders might be given lower priority due to the principal shareholder‟s 
interests. Directors‟ legal provisions in New Zealand mostly serve the shareholders whereas 
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the US corporate governance is mostly based on rules that have a propensity to protect 
stakeholders. 
Finally, the financial reporting standards are mostly principle and guideline based which 
allows flexibility in financial reporting. The judgement of the standard of financial reporting 
may differ from industry to industry or even firm to firm. However, rule based financial 
reporting still enables a firm to prepare financial reports in their own unique manner as all the 
firms are obliged to comply with a single rule. Investor protection is much stricter, due to 
mandatory regulation and more accurate forecasting expected from management. 
1.4 Research Findings 
The findings of the first objective, determinants of corporate governance compliance reveal 
that the existence of corporate governance regulation is indeed a significant factor in firms 
compliance levels. In fact, the results suggest that firms comply with regulation even in the 
absence of mandatory obligation to comply. Long term business operating and listing tenure 
have significant effects on corporate governance compliance, which implies that corporate 
governance practices increase with the maturity of the firm. In addition, concentrated 
ownership also correlates with better corporate governance practices with regulation. 
The second objective, consequences of higher corporate governance compliance, shows a 
short term effect as lower discretionary accruals. In addition, firms with large shareholdings 
show higher discretionary accruals whereas firms listed in the stock exchange reveal lower 
discretionary accruals. This implies that concentrated ownership has a significant impact on 
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are calculated using free cash flow and 
compared using the most widely used earnings management models such as the Jones Model 
(1991), Modified Jones Model (1995) and Performance Matched Model (2005). 
The third objective, consequences of higher corporate governance compliance, shows long 
term effects on shareholders‟ views such as firm value. Shareholders and managers both have 
the shared objective of maximising a firm‟s value in the long run. The firm‟s value is 
calculated based on enterprise value, which reflects the current market value while also 
considering cash holdings and debt obligations. Results show that high compliance with 
corporate governance regulation increases firm value. A firm operating with concentrated 
ownership was shown to reduce the value of a firm which implies that minority shareholders 
encounter risks when investing in highly centralised ownership firms. 
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1.5 Research Contributions 
This research contributes to corporate governance, earnings management and firm value 
literature and practices in the New Zealand context. 
This is the first research of corporate governance in New Zealand to include a wide range of 
corporate governance factors when analysing the consequences of compliance with corporate 
governance regulation. Therefore, a comprehensive corporate governance index was 
prepared, following the New Zealand corporate governance regulations. It includes different 
aspects of compliance such as boards of directors, board committees, external auditors, 
management ownership and dual stock exchange listing. As a consequence, both short term 
and long term effects were measured for the companies complying with better corporate 
governance. 
The second contribution was that of using discretionary accruals to measure the effect of 
better corporate governance compliance with regulations. Management have more 
discretionary opportunity in the area of free cash flow. Previous research focused on 
operating cash flow but management also have more discretionary options in financing cash 
flow. So, cash flow from operating and financing activities were both deducted from net 
income to measure total accruals. The association of performance and discretionary accruals 
was evidenced by return on assets. The Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model, which 
was based on free cash flow measurement, showed better explanatory power in comparison 
with the Jones Model (1991), Modified Jones Model (1995) and Performance Matched 
Model (2005).  
Thirdly, firm value measured as the enterprise value. The enterprise value calculation 
considers debts when buyers take over the firm, reflecting a more accurate firm value than the 
immediate takeover price. This research contributes to the literature that asserts enterprise 
value has more explanatory power than the two other commonly used models: Tobin‟s Q and 
Price-to-book ratio.  
Finally, this research evidenced that firms comply with voluntary regulation in the absence of 
mandatory obligation, which means non-compliant firms fall under pressure from compliant 
companies in the same industry. Similarly, potential shareholders want to make sure proper 
 9 
 
internal control systems exist before investing, showing that investors in a structured capital 
market like New Zealand are also aware of the benefits of corporate governance compliance.  
1.6 Research Outline 
This research proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 presents the first objective, namely: Firm 
Characteristics and Corporate Governance – Evidence from New Zealand. Chapter 3 presents 
the second objective, namely: Corporate Governance Compliance and Discretionary 
Accruals: A Comparative Analysis of New Zealand Companies. Chapter 4 presents the third 
objective of this research, namely: The Effect of Corporate Governance Regulation on Firm 
Value: New Zealand Evidence. Finally, the research concludes in Chapter 5. Each of the 
chapters 2, 3 and 4 includes the sections of introduction, literature review, hypothesis, 
methodology, sampling process, results analysis and conclusions.  
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Chapter 2 
Firm Characteristics and Corporate Governance – 
Evidence from New Zealand
3
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter contributes to the corporate governance regulation literature by investigating the 
association between characteristics of the firm and compliance with corporate governance 
regulation in a regulatory environment where enforcement is not mandated but follows a 
„comply or explain‟ regime. Most of the corporate governance best practice codes are of the 
„comply or explain‟ type, which means that firms need to mention the cause of non-
compliance whereas voluntary regulation allows firms to ignore the non-compliance without 
explanation. Understanding the determinants of corporate governance compliance is 
important because the existing literature does not show any concrete evidence concerning 
companies that operate in the „comply or explain‟ environment. However, it is noted that 
investors generally prefer that firms do comply with corporate governance regulations 
because this signals better accountability of directors, strong internal control systems and 
accurate financial reporting. 
The separation of ownership from management raises the issue of monitoring managerial 
activities to ensure investor confidence. Following a spate of well-publicised corporate 
collapses in the USA, UK, Europe and Australia, among others, corporate governance has 
been the centre of attention in the world of business and economics. Users of accounting 
information, such as investors, government agencies, auditors and financial analysts, have 
focussed on monitoring corporate governance systems. This leads to increased disclosures 
about corporate governance, demands for the regulation of systems of corporate governance, 
and consequentially, enhanced internal control systems. Regulators, academics and 
practitioners around the world now evaluate corporate governance regulations and 
compliance from inception to the implementation of a suitable and sustainable system that 
                                                 
3
 This Chapter provided the basis of a paper that was co-authored with Dr. Jamal Roudaki and Murray Clark, 
and was published at a conference on Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis, The Wharton 
School, Philadelphia, USA, September 24-25, 2010. 
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takes account of the socio-economic environment relevant to any particular company. The 
issue of compliance with corporate governance regulations/guidelines is the focus of this 
chapter. 
Corporate governance is not new; systems of corporate governance have  been in place for 
quite some time before the introduction of recent regulations or guidelines such as the 
Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 2003 published by the New Zealand (Stock) 
Exchange (NZX) , the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the USA, and the OECD Corporate 
Governance Guidelines (Goldfinch, 2004). Most of these corporate governance codes are 
voluntary in nature, but it is expected that companies will achieve a minimum level of 
compliance in order to meet their perceived social responsibilities. 
Researchers argue against non-mandatory regulations (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Blackman, 2008; Carver, 2007; MacNeil & Li, 2006; Sinclair, 1997) because the flexible 
nature of this type of compliance regime does not necessarily lead to the lowering of the cost 
of capital for the companies involved (Darren, 1997; Fasterling, 2005; Jesover & Kirkpatrick, 
2005). Voluntary regulations, however, can be effective  because compliance enables 
companies to satisfy  specific requirements, and  the level of compliance is influenced, if not 
determined, by the characteristics of these firms (Collett & Hrasky, 2005). Consequently, it is 
important to determine the factors that influence compliance with corporate governance 
regulations in a regulated environment. Irrespective of the nature of corporate governance 
regulations, it is apparent  that regulation has a positive impact on governance compliance 
(Shivasani & Zenner, 2004). 
The results of this study show that New Zealand companies comply with corporate 
governance regulations even though it is not mandatory to do so. Evidence was also found of 
compliance with corporate governance regulations being positively associated with stock 
exchange listing tenure, business operating tenure and concentrated ownership structure of 
companies, and negatively associated with the business operating cycle. This research 
contributes to the literature by providing a test that incorporates a comprehensive corporate 
governance index. These tests appear theoretically superior to the single period tests used in 
much of prior research on voluntary corporate governance compliance (Collett & Hrasky, 
2005) 
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows, section 2.2 reviews the prior literature 
on governance regulations. Section 2.3 develops the hypotheses, section 2.4 describes the 
research methodology, and section 2.5 explains the data used in this study. Data analysis is 
presented in section 2.6 as descriptive, correlation and regression analysis. Finally, section 
2.7 presents the research findings and comments on further research and recommendations.  
2.2 Literature Review 
The fundamental controversy that affects firms was pointed out by Adam Smith (1776) 
indicating that managers do not exercise the same degree of vigilance because they are not 
dealing with their own money. Berle and Means (1932) initiated the discussion on „conflict of 
interest‟ regarding the  separation of owners and managers in large corporations.  Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) document that managers may commit „moral hazard‟ merely to enhance 
their own personal wealth at the expense of the principals. Jensen (1983) recognises two steps 
in minimizing this agency problem; the efficient design of risk bearing mechanisms and  
monitoring of management, i.e. „positive agency theory‟. Risk bearing mechanisms indicate 
transferring the optimum level of decision making rights to managers in order to maximise 
return on investment, while  positive agency theory means modelling the effects of additional 
aspects of organizations and their survival, such as capital intensity and information costs. 
 The word „corporate governance‟ was first used by Richard Eells (1960) to mean  a set of 
customs, policies and laws used to direct and control a corporation. Corporate governance 
was initially centred on board of director independence and effectiveness. Following a series 
of corporate collapses that occurred early last decade, the roles played by supervisory 
committees and auditors as mechanisms of corporate governance, along with management 
ethics, have increased in importance. The Cadbury report in 1992, regarding the voluntary 
regulation of corporate governance, was a milestone report that led to many countries issuing 
„best practice codes‟ for corporate governance. The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) 2002 in the 
United States of America is probably the most recognised response to the many corporate 
collapses that occurred in that country. The main focus of SOX is on enhancing internal 
control mechanisms, promoting audit independence, and providing penalties for non-
compliance. Compliance with SOX is mandatory for US listed companies. 
A review of the literature shows that company performance is enhanced when corporate 
governance regulations or guidelines have been complied with. Investors, regulators and 
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other stakeholders clearly consider compliance to be important (Fasterling, 2005). In addition 
to regulation, governance practices are also reflected in different factors such as culture, 
traditional financial options, corporate ownership patterns and legal origins (Zattoni & 
Francesca, 2008). It is generally accepted that the purpose of regulations concerning 
corporate governance is not to increase the value of a firm but to enhance the „safety‟ of 
investors. Consequently pressure from the regulatory authorities will „encourage‟ firms to 
comply with voluntary codes of best practice.  Bechner and Freyer (2009) suggest that 
regulations and governance act in a complementary manner to resolve the agency problem 
associated with absentee owners. Regulations reduce management dominance in the firm by 
increasing the influence of external parties such as auditors and shareholders. Conversely, 
deregulation increases the influence of management (Kole & Lehn, 1997). 
In a regulated environment, the internal control system of firms is expected to be secure, 
whereas monitoring costs are higher if the environment is deregulated because firms need to 
regularly monitor management activity for the sake of shareholders‟ investment and return. 
Therefore, it can be argued that a regulated environment ensures better monitoring and lower 
agency costs. Moreover, regulations ensure a unique system or standard in the economy and 
enable the comparison of industry level practice. In short, the business environment will be 
unstable in the absence of regulations (Kole & Lehn, 1997). 
Regulation, as the most basic external corporate governance mechanism, has received greater 
attention since the beginning of 21
st
  century (Denis, 2001). Firms operating in a competitive 
market are essentially required to have a minimum level of corporate governance structure 
because of general regulations and civil laws. Kole and Lehn (1997) argue that firms will not 
be able to exist without corporate governance. 
The main reasons for implementing a code of corporate governance then, are the mitigation 
of the agency problem and the provision of improved monitoring for shareholders. Machuga 
and Karen (2009) suggest the following three reasons for the protection of shareholders‟ 
interest. Firstly, regulations provide guidelines for achieving the maximum benefit for 
investors. Secondly, regulations are necessary to ensure the maintenance of an appropriate 
standard of governance, and finally, maintaining governance standard reduces cost of capital 
which enhances firm value for shareholders. 
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In summary, the corporate governance literature explained different effects of corporate 
governance compliance (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Lara, Osmab, & Penalvac, 2007; 
Stiles, 2001) but this research elaborates on existing knowledge by documenting the 
determinants that relate to the „comply or explain‟ type of regulation. Specifically, this 
research assumes that corporate governance compliance level does not depend on regulation 
only. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses developed in this section test the relationship between the corporate 
governance index (calculated as detailed in the following section) and the existence of 
corporate governance regulations, listing tenure, ownership concentration, and business 
operation tenure – all factors acting as determinants of corporate governance compliance with 
regulations. 
2.3.1 Regulation 
As discussed above, corporate governance evolved due to the existence of the agency 
problem associated with the separation of owners and managers, and regulation can mitigate 
the conflicts that arise as a result (Drobetz, 2002; Kirkbride & Letza, 2004). It is generally 
assumed that a regulatory environment would result in enhanced corporate governance 
because companies are meant to comply with the relevant regulations, and the literature 
shows that regulation has a positive impact on corporate governance compliance (Hermalin, 
2005; La-Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, & Shleifer, 1998, 1999; Udaysankar & Das, 2007). Indeed, 
regulation has always had an impact on general financial reporting and disclosure practices. 
Regulation also enhances the quality of audited report followed by organizational 
performance. Conversely, companies operating in the market have a minimum corporate 
governance practice (Kole & Lehn, 1997) but compliance is always questionable in the 
absence of mandatory regulation and guidelines. Thus, the first hypothesis stated in the null 
form is:  
H01: There is no relationship between corporate governance regulation and corporate 
governance compliance. 
2.3.2 Listing tenure 
The Stock Exchange is one of the main promoters of corporate governance compliance. 
Cormier & Martinez (2006) evidenced a positive association between corporate governance 
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compliance and stock market listing. The New Zealand (Stock) Exchange (NZX) has 
prepared and published the Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 2003, based on 
principles and guidelines of corporate governance as issued by the Securities Commission of 
New Zealand. Listing on the New Zealand Exchange requires companies to comply with all 
the regulations of government and the Securities Commission. It is therefore anticipated that 
companies that have been listed for a long period of time will have a greater degree of 
compliance with the corporate governance best practice code as compared to companies that 
have only been listed for a short period of time.  Hence the second hypothesis which, stated 
in the null form, is as follows: 
H02: There is no relationship between listing tenure and corporate governance 
compliance. 
2.3.3 Ownership concentration 
Separation of ownership and management raises conflicts between the goals of owners and 
managers, which may be due to different managerial effort and attitudes toward risk. 
Therefore, different control mechanisms like internal audit or external control should be used 
to align the interests of both parties. Agency costs and risk can be reduced by sharing 
ownership of the organization (Bozec & Bozec, 2007). However, concentration of ownership 
may frustrate the reduction in agency costs and risks since the degree of control that can be 
exerted by the owners of concentrated holdings may lead to decisions intended to maximise 
their personal wealth. Effective corporate governance should counter this possibility. It is 
therefore hypothesised that companies that comply with the corporate governance code will 
not be influenced by parties that have concentrated holdings of shares. Thus the third 
hypothesis, stated in the null form, is: 
H03: There is no relationship between ownership concentration and corporate 
governance compliance. 
2.3.4 Business operating tenure 
Firms that survive in the competitive market are presumed to have an optimum level of 
corporate governance compliance (Kole & Lehn, 1997), and it should not matter whether 
these companies exist in a regulated or unregulated environment. Indeed, companies have 
been in existence for decades, long before any regulations for corporate governance were 
promulgated.  Arguably, firms that have been operating for a long time must have a strong 
system of corporate governance (Owusu-Ansah, 2005). On the other hand, voluntary 
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compliance with corporate governance codes may impose a significant cost on those 
companies and they may not be willing to comply unless it is mandatory to do so. Companies 
also need to signal to stakeholders that they do have a „good‟ level of corporate governance, 
particularly if they are a mature company. Growth firms, on the other hand, tend to be more 
aggressive during their start-up stage and, perhaps, have slightly less effective internal control 
systems. It is therefore hypothesised that in a regulated environment, a mature firm will have 
a high level of compliance with corporate governance regulations. Hence, the fourth 
hypothesis, stated in the null form, is: 
H04: There is no relationship between business operating tenure and corporate 
governance compliance. 
2.4 Methodology 
This section describes the research methodology used in this study, the dependent and 
independent and control variables, the corporate governance index that was used and the 
measurement of the dependent variables. 
2.4.1 Corporate Governance Index 
Corporate governance consists of a complex set of interrelationships so using a single factor 
or variable to measure corporate governance is problematic. Researchers tend to examine the 
overall impact of a much broader corporate governance mechanism by formulating a 
corporate governance index and rating systems (Beekes & Brown, 2006; Berghe & Levrau, 
2004; Florou & Galarniotis, 2007; Strenger, 2004). In this study, the index accumulates all 
aspects of corporate governance including board of directors‟ attributes, external auditor, 
supervisory committees, management shareholdings, and listing tenure of firms. 
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The index is calculated as: 
it
it
CVCG
CGI  = x100
MPVCGC
it


 
Where: 
CGI
it
   = Corporate governance index for firm i in year t; 
itCVCG  
   = Cumulative value of corporate governance for firm i in year t; 
itMPVCGC    = Maximum possible value of corporate governance compliance for 
firm i in year t; 
i     = firm; and 
t      = year. 
The corporate governance index is a composite measurement based on dichotomous variables 
and actual values measured (Lara et al., 2007; Larcker & Richardson, 2004; Larcker, 
Richardson, & Tuna, 2005, 2007).  
2.4.2 Measuring Corporate Governance Index 
A Corporate Governance Index (CGI) was prepared based on corporate governance 
regulations comprising the Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 2003 by New Zealand 
Exchange Limited, the Corporate Governance Guidelines and Principles issued by the 
Securities Commission of New Zealand Exchange Commission, plus other regulations such 
as the Companies Act 1993 and the NZX Listing Act.  The corporate governance index 
includes twenty factors grouped into four main categories (called scores), as follows: 
1. Board of Directors Score (BDS) 
I. Number of directors: The Companies Act 1993 requires that companies must 
have at least one director. The median number of directors for all companies 
in the sample were calculated to be six over the sample period, and each 
sample company was compared to this median. This variable is assigned a 
value of 1 if the number of directors is not less than the median, and 0 
otherwise. 
II. Board independence: The Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles 
and Guidelines 2004 (Securities Commission of New Zealand) recommended 
that there should be an appropriate balance of executive and non-executive 
directors. The NZX listing rules and the Code of Practice for Directors in 
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New Zealand suggest that the majority of directors should be independent and 
that there should be at least two independent non-executive directors. The 
median ratio of independent directors for all companies was calculated to be 
0.60. This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the ratio of independent 
directors is not less than the median, and 0 otherwise. 
III. Board tenure:   Businesses operate in an increasingly complex environment and 
the tenure of the top management team have an effect on firm performance 
(Canavan, Jones, & Potter, 2004). Newly appointed managers need time to 
adjust to the business environment and to set up appropriate strategies that 
align with existing goals. Conversely, directors who stay with the same firm 
for a period of time should be more familiar with and better understand the 
governance requirements for that business. The corporate governance 
regulations encourage re-appointment of directors, but remain silent on what 
the most appropriate tenure might be. The median combined tenure (in years) 
of the directors on the board for all companies in the sample was calculated to 
be 31 years, and each sample company was compared to this median. This 
variable is assigned a value of 1 if the combined tenure (in years) of all 
directors in the sample company exceeds the median, otherwise the value is 0. 
IV. Busy board: The Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and 
Guidelines 2004 suggest that the board should allocate time and resources to 
encourage directors to acquire and retain a sound understanding of their 
responsibilities. Board members who hold directorships in other firms have 
less time to devote to any particular entity, but the corporate governance 
regulations are silent about the specific number of directorships that would be 
appropriate for one individual to hold. The median measure of board 
„busyness‟ – the total outside directorships held by the board for all the 
companies in the sample was calculated to be 24, and each sample company 
was compared to this median. This variable is assigned a value of 0 if the total 
outside directorships is greater than median, otherwise the value is 1. 
V. Board Meetings: The Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and 
Guidelines 2004 state that the board should allocate time and resources to 
understanding their responsibilities and the implementation of monitoring 
activities. However, these guidelines are silent with respect to the frequency 
of board meetings. The median number of board meetings per year for all 
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companies in the sample were calculated to be 8, and each company was 
compared to this median. This variable is assigned the value of 0 if the 
number of board meetings was less than the median, otherwise the value is 1. 
VI. CEO Duality: The Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and 
Guidelines 2004, the NZX listing rules, and the Corporate Governance Best 
Practice Code 2003, all recommend that the Chief Executive Officer should 
not be the chair of the Board. This variable is assigned the value of 0 where 
the CEO has this dual role, 1 otherwise. 
VII.CEO experience: The longer the CEO has been employed by the company, the 
more he or she should know and understand the activities of the company; 
hence he or she should be more valuable as a director. It also follows that 
CEO experience should be a factor that contributes to the success of the 
corporate governance practices of the firm as well as to the overall success of 
the firm. The median period of tenure as CEO was calculated for all 
companies in the sample and each sample company was compared to this 
median to be 3 years. This variable is assigned the value of 1 if the CEO has 
not less than the median number of years of experience and 0 otherwise.  
2. Board Committee Score (BCS) 
I. Number of board committees: The Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 
2003 and the NZX listing rules recommend that every board should have an 
Audit Committee, a Remuneration Committee, and a Nomination Committee.  
Companies that have all three board committees are coded 1, 0 otherwise. 
II. Audit committee size: The NZX listing rules and the Corporate Governance in 
New Zealand Principles and Guidelines 2004 both emphasise that the size of 
the audit committee is an important factor in the effective monitoring of 
internal control systems and in maintaining an effective relationship with the 
external auditor. The median size of the audit committee was calculated as 3 
members for all companies in the sample and each sample company was 
compared to this median. This variable is assigned the value of 1 if the audit 
committee was not smaller than the median, 0 otherwise. 
III. Audit committee financial expertise: The NZX listing rules and the Corporate 
Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines 2004 both specify that 
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at least one member of the audit committee should have financial expertise. 
This variable was assigned the value of 1 if the company followed this 
recommendation, 0 otherwise. 
IV. Audit committee meetings: As stated above, both the NZX listing rules and the 
Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines 2004 
recommend that companies have an effective audit committee. Prior research 
suggests that the frequency of audit committee meetings is an indicator of the 
effectiveness of that  committee  (DeAngelo, 1981). The median number of 
meetings held by the audit committee is calculated as 3 times a year for all 
companies in the sample and each sample company compared with this 
median. This variable is assigned the value of 0 if the audit committee met less 
frequently than the median and 1 otherwise. 
V. Audit committee experience: Following similar arguments as advanced for 
experience as a director, the collective experience of the audit committee 
members is also a factor in having an effective audit committee. The median 
number of total years experience as a member of the audit committee was 
calculated to be total 18 years for all companies in the sample and each sample 
company were compared to this. This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the 
experience of the audit committee was not less than the median, and 0 
otherwise. 
VI. Chair of audit committee: The Corporate Governance in New Zealand: 
Principles and Guidelines 2004 recommend that the chair of the board of 
directors should not also be the chair of the audit committee. This variable is 
assigned a value of 0 if the same person was appointed as chair of both 
committees, and 1 otherwise. 
VII. Independent directors in audit committee: The NZX listing rules, the 
Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 2003 and the Corporate 
Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines 2004, all recommend 
that every member of the audit committee should be a non-executive director 
and the majority of directors should be independent. The median ratio of 
independent directors on the audit committee was calculated as 0.67 for all 
companies in the sample and each sample company compared to this median. 
This variable was assigned a value of 0 if the number of independent directors 
on the audit committee is less than the median, and 1 otherwise. 
 21 
 
VIII. Independent and executive director ratio in nomination committee: The 
composition of the nomination committee provides a signal to the market 
regarding the  company‟s attitude  towards the selection of directors as well as 
board independence (Bostock, 1995). The Corporate Governance Best Practice 
Code 2003 and the NZX listing rules both recommend that independent 
directors should make up the majority of the Nomination Committee. The 
median ratio of independent directors on the nomination committee was 
calculated to be 0.40 for all companies over the sample periods and each 
sample company were compared to median. This variable is assigned a value 
of 0 if the ratio of independent directors on the audit committee is less than the 
median, and 1 otherwise. 
3. Audit Score (AS): 
I. Big 4 audit firm4: The Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and 
Guidelines 2004 emphasise the importance of having a high quality external 
auditors and audit processes. It is expected that the „Big 4‟ audit firms will 
provide a higher quality audit process and independent audit opinion. This 
variable is therefore assigned a value of 1 if the company is audited by a „Big 
4‟ firm, and 0 otherwise. 
II. Auditor tenure: The Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and 
Guidelines 2004 recommend that the maximum period of appointment for an 
auditor should not exceed five consecutive years. This variable is therefore 
assigned a value of 0 if the company is audited by the same auditor for more 
than five years and 1 otherwise. 
III. Non-audit fee and audit fee ratio: The Corporate Governance in New Zealand: 
Principles and Guidelines 2004 recommend that the board should annually 
report to the shareholders and stakeholders the amount of fees paid to the 
auditor for audit and non-audit services separately. Moreover, non audit work 
should not be capped to a specific proportion of all fees paid to an audit firm. 
The median ratio of audit fees to total fees was calculated as 0.40 for all 
companies in the sample and each sample company was compared to this 
                                                 
4
 Big 6, Big 5 and Big 4 are contemporary terms. 
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median. This variable is assigned a value of 0 if the ratio of fees paid to the 
auditors is more than the median, and 1 otherwise.  
4. Director Ownership and Listing Score (DOLS): 
I. Overseas listing status: The NZX listing rules exempt some companies that are 
listed overseas and in New Zealand from having to comply with some of the 
corporate governance requirements. It is assumed that overseas listing impacts 
positively on the quality of the firm‟s corporate governance practices. This 
variable is assigned a value of 1 if the company is also listed on an overseas 
stock exchange and 0 otherwise, i.e. if the company is listed only on the New 
Zealand stock exchange. 
II. Director shareholdings: Shares that are directly or indirectly held by directors 
could lead to decisions that benefit them personally at the expense of the 
company. Thus their judgement or decisions could be impaired, or at least 
influenced, by their personal shareholdings.  The possibility of such a conflict 
of interest is considered to be factor that could influence the efficacy of the 
firm‟s corporate governance practices. The median proportion of director 
shareholding as compared to the total outstanding shares of the firm over the 
duration of the study was calculated to be 3.15%. The proportion of director 
shareholding for each company was compared to the median and the variable 
is assigned a value of 0 if the proportion of director shareholding is greater 
than the median, otherwise the value is 1. 
An index of corporate governance was prepared based on the twenty factors explained above. 
The maximum value for the corporate governance index is twenty, which initiates the highest 
level of compliance with corporate governance regulation and guidelines. 
2.4.3 Independent Variables 
The independent variables of corporate governance index are described below. 
2.4.3.1 Regulation 
Companies that operate in a regulated environment are expected to have higher compliance 
with corporate governance regulations than companies that operate in an unregulated 
environment. A dummy variable equal to 1 is assigned to companies that are operating after 
2003 (the year when the Corporate Governance Code was adopted) whereas companies 
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operating before 2003 (inclusive) are assigned 0. A positive relationship with the corporate 
governance index is therefore expected. 
2.4.3.2 Listing Tenure 
Listing tenure is measured in years as the New Zealand Stock Exchange listing duration till to 
the respective sample period. A positive relationship with the corporate governance index is 
expected because firms that have been listed for a period of time have to comply with the 
NZX listing requirements with regard to corporate governance.  
2.4.3.3 Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration is measured as the natural log of the Top-20 shareholders of the 
firms. Large shareholders have more influence over the activities of the firm, which may lead 
to the pursuit of objectives set by these shareholders rather than for the benefit of all 
shareholders. The corollary is that small shareholders are essentially powerless and have little 
or no influence over business activities. Therefore, a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and the corporate governance index is expected. 
2.4.3.4 Business Operating Tenure 
Business operating tenure is measured as the log value of the operating years of the firm from 
the incorporation of business to the respective sample period. Firms operating for a short 
period of time  may overtly comply with the regulations in order to appear more attractive to 
potential investors, but those who have been operating for a considerable period of time may 
„slacken off‟.  A negative (positive) relationship between longer business operating tenure 
(shorter business tenure) and the corporate governance index should exist, respectively. 
2.4.4 Control variables 
Most of the corporate governance factors depend on business size, measured as total assets 
(Cormier & Martinez, 2006). Company size has an impact on the composition of the board, 
the audit process, the structure of the audit committee, and the independences of directors. 
Further, the „depth‟ of audit service depth and the choice of auditor are also influenced by the 
size of the business. Consequently, total assets were used as a proxy for firm size. A review 
of the literature also reveals that  leverage is another factor that is controlled for in prior 
research (Cormier & Martinez, 2006); so, does this study. Ideally, a highly leveraged firm 
will have more supervision and needs a strong system of internal control structure. Such 
companies are likely to have more independent directors, which should lead to better 
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corporate governance. Similarly, monitoring activities may impact on audit structure of the 
business. 
2.4.5 Regression Model: Ordinary Least Square 
The following regression model was used to examine the effect of the variables outlined 
above on the corporate governance index. 
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Where: 
CGI      = Corporate Governance Index; 
REGDUMMY = Regulation dummy 1 for regulated corporate governance regime 
and 0 otherwise; 
NZXLIST  = NZX listing tenure; 
OWNCON     = Log value of Top 20 shareholders ownership accumulation; 
BUSSOPER    = Log value of business operation tenure; 
BUSSSIZE     = Total Assets as a proxy of Business Size; 
LEVERAGE    =Log value of firm leverage; 
SECTOR_DUMMY   = Dummy variable of sectors; 
      =Error term 
i       = Individual firm  
t      = Year 
Equation 1 implies that the firm‟s current corporate governance index rating is determined in 
a systematic manner by its regulatory environment (REGDUMMY); stock exchange listing 
tenure (NZXLIST); ownership concentration (OWNCON) [indicating the ownership of the 
top 20 shareholders]; operating tenure of the firm (BUSSOPER); firm size (a proxy for total 
assets); leverage (a proxy of external stakeholders: debt financing); and dummy variables 
representing six different sectors of production following NZX listing category. The service 
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sector is the intercept of the equation and the other five dummy variables represent the other 
sectors (primary, energy, goods, property, and investment),  thereby avoiding the  dummy-
variable trap (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). In other words 1  represents the service sector and 
8( ), 9( ), 10( ), 11( ), 12( ),    and primary energy goods property investment      are the differential intercept coefficients 
that indicate how much the intercepts of primary, energy, goods, property and investment 
sectors differ from the intercept of service sector. In effect, the service sector becomes the 
comparison sector. Researchers are free to use any dummy variable as the intercept (Gujarati 
& Porter, 2009), and the service sector was selected because of the number of companies in 
service sector being  higher than other sectors.  
2.5 Data 
The sample of companies used in this study was selected from those listed by the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange Limited (NZX). There are two markets in the NZ Stock Exchange. 
The New Zealand Stock Market (NZSE) is the main board of NZX where the premium 
equities are traded. The second board is the New Zealand Alternative Market (NZAX) which 
comprises companies which, typically, are  new, experiencing rapid growth, and able to issue 
shares for low cost. The sample was drawn from both markets. The sample period covers the 
years 2000 to 2007, inclusive.  By the end of august 2008, a total of 153 companies were 
listed by NZX. Twenty nine Companies were excluded as those operated in the financial 
sector which is subject to specific regulations and reporting procedures. Thirty-five 
companies did not provide a complete set of financial reports, and the financial information 
for 19 companies was not available. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Sample Listed Companies 
Sector # 
Primary  9 
Energy  8 
Goods  11 
Property  5 
Investment  5 
Service  32 
Final Sample 70 
  
The final sample of 70 companies was classified in six sectors using the NZX categories, as 
above in table 1. 
2.6 Results 
The objective of this study was to investigate corporate governance compliance due to 
regulatory supervision as exemplified by the Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 2003, 
Companies Listing Code, and Companies Act 1993. The results of descriptive statistic, 
correlation matrix and regression analysis are presented here. 
2.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
The composition of the Board of directors has been  recognised as the primary corporate 
governance factor  (Hossain, Prevost, & Rao, 2001). Table 2 shows the average board size to 
be approximately 7 members with 4 independent directors.  Hossain et al. (2001) found 
similar results using an NZX sample taken from the period 1992-97. They also found 135 
firm years (22%) CEO dualities whereas our finding indicates 90% of firms are free of CEO 
duality. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Analysis of CGI - Board of directors 
Details 
Total 
Directors 
(Person) 
Board 
Independence  
(Person) 
Board 
Meetings 
(Number) 
Busy Board 
(Outside 
directorship) 
Experience 
of Board 
(Year) 
CEO 
Duality 
(Binary) 
CEO 
Experience 
(Year) 
Mean 6.23 3.83 7.84 25.8 35.82 0.90 4.7 
Median 6 4 8 23.5 31 1 3 
Maximum 13 12 15 108 122 1 23 
Minimum 3 0 1 7 4 0 1 
Std. Dev. 1.58 1.55 2.912 13.12 19.66 0.30 3.87 
Moreover, Ahmed, Hossain and Adams (2006) documented 7 (specifically 6.538) board 
members with 56.5% being independent directors. They also documented 18.9% firm years 
under CEO duality. These results show that the size of the board of directors and the degree 
of director independence has remained the same, but that CEO duality has fallen. It is 
suggested that this fall is due to the implementation of corporate governance regulations. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Analysis of CGI – Board Committees 
Details 
Audit 
Committee 
Chairman 
(Binary) 
Audit 
Committee 
Education 
(Binary) 
Audit 
Committee 
Experience 
(Year) 
Audit 
Committee 
Independent 
Director 
Ratio 
Audit 
Committee 
Meeting 
Frequency 
Audit 
Committee 
Size 
(Person) 
Nomination 
Committee 
Independence 
Ratio 
Total 
Board 
Committee 
(Number) 
Mean 0.73 0.92 20.24 0.69 3.37 3.31 0.40 2.41 
Median 0 1 18 0.67 3 3 0.40 3 
Maximum 1 1 62 1.67 12 7 1 3 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard. 
Deviation 
0.5 0.27 11.90 0.28 1.70 0.96 0.36 0.81 
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New Zealand companies are practicing better corporate governance by using board 
committees such as audit, remuneration and nomination committees. Porter & Gendall (1998) 
found that 60% of companies had audit committees whereas results in table 3 show that 73% 
of New Zealand companies now have audit committees. Therefore it can be concluded that 
corporate governance practices have improved. The minimum size of audit committees  
remains the same at (approximately) 4 members, as reported in previous research (Porter & 
Gendall, 1998). They consider that having an audit committee is a good indication of 
corporate governance practice. Moreover, this research finds that 69% of companies have 
independent directors, which is in line with the recommended corporate governance 
guidelines.  
Table 4 shows that the Big-4 audit firms are dominant (87% coverage) with an average tenure 
of 5 years with the same firm. Non-audit fees are also close to the audit fees in New Zealand, 
which indicates relatively less independence of auditors. The average non-audit fee is 87% of 
the audit fee over the sample period. 
Table 4: Descriptive Analysis of CGI - Auditor 
Details 
BIG Four Auditor 
(Binary) 
Auditor Tenure 
(Year) 
Ratio of Non-Audit and 
audit fee 
Mean 0.87 4.76 0.87 
Median 1 4 0.40 
Maximum 1 15 20.4 
Minimum 0 1 0 
Std. Dev. 0.34 2.95 1.60 
 
Table 5 shows that 43% of companies have dual listing status, i.e. they are listed on the New 
Zealand and an overseas exchange. Table 5 also shows that  the percentage of  management 
ownership is 17.5%  shareholding,  whereas Ahmed et al. (2006) found only 6.9% of inside 
ownership. This indicates that insiders are getting more involved in New Zealand firms. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Analysis of CGI – Dual Listing and Management ownership 
Details 
Dual Listing Status 
(Binary) 
Ratio of Management 
Shareholdings 
 Mean 0.44 0.17 
 Median 0 0.03 
 Maximum 1 4.14 
 Minimum 0 0.74 
 Std. Dev. 0.50 0.39 
 
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 show the descriptive statistics of the corporate governance index for all 
sample years. The following table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of the determinants of the 
corporate governance variables. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Governance Variable 
Details 
Corporate 
Governance 
Index 
Regulation 
Dummy 
NZX 
Listing 
Tenure 
Operating 
Tenure 
Log of Top-20 
Shareholders 
Log of 
Total 
Assets 
Leverage 
 Mean 0.54 0.50 14.05 30.70 1.82 5.21 0.29 
 Median 0.50 0.50 10.00 18.00 1.85 5.16 0.25 
 Maximum 0.90 1.00 49.00 148.00 1.99 8.48 4.57 
 Minimum 0.25 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.33 2.91 0.00 
 Std. Dev. 0.12 0.50 11.70 34.29 0.13 0.96 0.33 
 
Table 6 shows that average corporate governance compliance is 0.536, with the maximum 
compliance index of 0.90 and the minimum of 0.25. This implies that no company fully 
complied with the corporate governance regulations over the period of the study. The average 
listing tenure on the stock exchange was 14.052 years while the average age of the business 
was 30.704 years, indicating that companies are listing on the stock exchange a significant 
time after the business commenced operating. 
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2.6.2 Correlation Matrix: 
Table 7 shows that all the independent variables, such as regulation dummy, NZX listing 
tenure, business operating tenure, natural log value of top-20 shareholders, and control 
variables, like natural log of total assets as proxy for business size, have a statistically 
significant positive correlation with the corporate governance index. This indicates that the 
firm has been operating for a long time in a regulated environment, with listed status on the 
stock exchange and concentrated ownership structure promoting stronger corporate 
governance compliance. Leverage has a statistically insignificant relationship with the 
corporate governance index. Moreover, the independent variables are free from strong 
correlation with each other, indicating that multi-collinearity is not a problem. 
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Corporate Governance 
Index (1) 1                         
Regulation Dummy (2) 0.14*** 1                       
NZX Listing Tenure (3) 0.12*** 0.17*** 1                     
Business Operating 
Tenure (4) 0.09** 0.06 0.26*** 1                   
Log of Top-20 
Shareholders (5) 0.24*** 0.07* -0.08* -0.02 1                 
Log of Total Assets (6) 0.46*** 0.05 0.04 0.16*** 0.15*** 1               
Leverage (7) 0.01 0.06 -0.05 -0.16*** -0.09** 0.11*** 1             
Service Sector (8) 0.15*** 0.00  0.06  -0.18***  -0.28***  -0.40***  -0.06  1            
Primary Sector (9) 0.12***  0.00  0.05  0.21***  -0.12**  0.09*  -0.04  -0.17**   1         
Energy Sector (10) -0.08**  0.00  -0.04   -0.11** 0.07  0.03  -0.05  -0.12**  -0.11*   1       
Goods Sector (11) -0.18***   0.00  0.01   0.02   0.17***  0.08  0.18*** -0.16***   -0.14***  -0.10**  1     
Property Sector (12)  -0.17***  0.00   0.01  -0.11***  0.16**  -0.01  -0.01  -0.12***  -0.11**  -0.08*  -0.10**  1   
Investment Sector (13)  0.28**  0.00   -0.07  0.09**  0.23**  -0.19***  -0.02  -0.40***  -0.354  -0.26***  -0.33**  -0.24***  1 
*** statistically significant at 1% level;  
**   statistically significant at 5% level; 
*     statistically significant at 10% level 
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2.6.3 Regression Analysis 
Table 8 shows the regression analysis result of corporate governance and other variables 
using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. To minimize the heteroskedasticity, White‟s 
cross-section least square was used, as most of the corporate governance indicators are 
identical and the tenure of NZX listing is relatively close to each other. Therefore, after 
minimizing the statistical error, the following results can be found. 
Table 8 also shows that the model‟s adjusted R-squared statistic is 0.59 and its Fisher statistic 
significance at 1% level, indicating the explanatory power of the corporate governance index, 
considering above mentioned independent variables. The Regulation dummy has a positive 
impact, indicating regulatory environments have a positive impact on corporate governance. 
Moreover, the negative intercept being statistically insignificant shows that in the absence of 
regulation, compliance with corporate governance regulations was negative, indicating that 
firms are reluctant to comply without regulatory obligation. This indicates the rejection of 
H01, consistent with the argument that existence of regulation increases the compliance rate 
of corporate governance. 
The New Zealand stock exchange listing act requires certain corporate governance criteria 
which indicates that listing status may increase compliance. Similarly, H02 was rejected and 
found New Zealand stock exchange listing tenure also has a positive impact on corporate 
governance with a level of 1% statistical significance.  
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Table 8: Regression Analysis 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic 
C -0.21 -7.85 
Regulation Dummy 0.03*** 4.02 
Listing Tenure 0.01*** 5.2 
Log of Top-20 Shareholder 0.20*** 13.43 
Operating Tenure -0.01* -1.55 
Leverage 0.02 1.05 
Log of Total Assets 0.05*** 15.6 
Primary Sector 0.11*** 23.13 
Energy Sector 0.10*** 9.37 
Goods Sector 0.11*** 6.8 
Property Sector 0.00 -0.2 
Investment Sector 0.00 -0.53 
R-squared 0.60  
Adjusted R-squared 0.59  
F-statistic 74.97  
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.00  
Durbin-Watson stat 1.95  
Observation 560  
*** statistically significant at 1% level; 
**   statistically significant at 5% level; 
*     statistically significant at 10% level. 
Ownership concentration is significant with compliance of corporate governance at 1% level. 
Concentrated ownership (Top 20 shareholders) has a positive coefficient of 0.20 which 
indicates that concentrated ownership enhances compliance with corporate governance 
regulations, thus H03 is rejected. It indicates that firms with more concentrated ownership 
tend towards increased regulation of corporate governance. 
Business operating tenure has a negative impact on corporate governance, indicating that the 
level of compliance decreases with the age of company. So, the H04 is rejected, suggesting 
that mature companies are not too concerned with complying with corporate governance 
regulations! Theoretically, a company needs to have robust systems of internal control and 
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corporate governance in order to reduce the cost of capital, but this research suggests that 
established companies are not worried about that. 
Leverage has a positive coefficient of 0.02 with the corporate governance index, indicating 
that levered companies are more compliant with corporate governance regulations.  However, 
leverage is not statistically significant at the 10% level. It seems that external loan providers 
have no influence on the level of compliance with corporate governance requirements. The 
other control variable of total assets also has a positive coefficient of 0.05 with the corporate 
governance index and a statistical significance level at 1%. It means that large firms with 
more assets are more compliant with corporate governance regulation. 
Corporate governance regulations compliance in each of the sectors is also different. Among 
six sectors of companies, only three sectors; primary, energy and goods sectors are 
statistically significant at 1% level, whereas the property and investment sector does not 
indicate any significance. However, the intercept, or service sector, has a negative non-
significant coefficient at less than 10% level. 
The results of the multiple regression analysis on the effects of corporate governance 
regulation indicate that the F-statistic for the model is 74.97 and the p-value is significant 
with an adjusted R-squared of 0.59, demonstrating that the overall model has strong 
explanatory power. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.95 indicates that there is no strong 
evidence of first order correlation since, as a rule of thumb, any d-value (Durbin-Watson) less 
or equal to 2 indicates that no first order serial auto-correlation exists. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The main objective of this study was to measure the level of compliance of corporate 
governance with corporate governance regulations in New Zealand listed companies. Indeed, 
the study found that corporate governance regulations have impacted significantly on 
corporate governance compliance. Although the New Zealand corporate governance systems 
lag behind those of comparable countries, which may lead to a  loss of confidence and a high 
tolerance of unfit directors (Farrar, 2005), it is suggested that compliance with the New 
Zealand Corporate Governance Principles and Guidelines will lead to the regaining of 
investor confidence.  Although questions have been raised about the efficacy of the voluntary 
form of corporate governance regulation, this research shows that compliance with such 
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regulations has increased. The increase in the level of compliance has resulted in an increase 
in investor confidence as well as company performance (Bhuiyan, Roudaki, & Clark, 2009; 
Brennan & McDermott, 2004; Prevost, Rao, & Hossain, 2002; Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 
2002) . 
The findings show that the existence of corporate governance regulations has a positive 
influence on corporate governance practice. Further, firm specific characteristics like NZX 
listing tenure and ownership concentration also have an influence on corporate governance. 
Business operation tenure was found to have an insignificant relationship to corporate 
governance compliance over the pre and post-regulation regime. Considering four specific 
characteristics, business operating tenure was found not to be significant but corporate 
governance regulation, New Zealand Stock Exchange listing tenure, and ownership 
concentration, were positively significant to governance compliance. In essence, this research 
supports the contention that the existence of a regulatory framework will increase the quality 
of corporate governance. 
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Chapter 3 
Corporate Governance Compliance and Discretionary 
Accruals: A comparative analysis of New Zealand 
companies
5
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter documents the association between corporate governance compliance and 
performance matched free cash flow discretionary accruals. Free cash flow (FCF) is the 
accumulation of cash flow from operating and investing activities and includes all cash flows 
relating to property, plant and equipment and investment in the balance sheet. It has been 
suggested that free cash flow is better matched with earnings (Dechow & Ge, 2006), and 
there is a considerable body of  literature that defines total accruals as the difference between 
net income and cash flow from operating activities (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Xie, 
Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003). This traditional approach has been extended by  Dechow & Ge 
(2006) who define total accruals as the difference between earnings and free cash flow. 
Recent research studies have used the free cash flow approach to accruals measurement 
(Bukit & Iskandar, 2009). 
Opportunities for earnings management are higher with the increase of free cash flow in 
business and, in the absence of proper monitoring of management; the risk that money might 
be misused by investing in less profitable projects is increased. Research studies on corporate 
governance and earnings management suggest that better corporate governance measures 
such as having independent directors, supervisory committees (such as the audit committee, 
nomination committee and remuneration committee), and quality external audits, can reduce  
opportunistic behaviour by management. 
Cash flow is an important basis for accrual measurement (Ingram & Lee, 2007). Prior 
literature on earnings management focused on identifying and expanding the set of variables 
                                                 
5
 This Chapter provided the basis for a paper that was co-authored with Dr. Jamal Roudaki and Murray Clark, 
and was presented at a conference on Asian Academic Accounting Association,, Thammasat Business School, 
Bangkok, Thailand, November 28 – December 1, 2010. 
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that influence discretionary accruals, using cash flow from operating activities (Leuz, Nanda, 
& Wysocki, 2003; McNichols & Wilson, 1988; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna, 2005; 
Siregar & Utama, 2008; Xie et al., 2003). However, free cash flow has not been considered 
when calculating total accruals in previous studies. As stated above, free cash flow is the 
combination of cash flow from operating activities and investing activities, which reflects the 
impact of cash spending on fixed assets and investments. Companies operating with high free 
cash flow provide greater opportunities for opportunistic behaviour by management. 
Therefore it is appropriate to suggest that free cash flow better reflects accruals for individual 
firms. 
General findings from research indicate that discretionary accruals are affected by corporate 
governance factors such as the composition of the board of directors, CEO duality, the 
composition of the audit committee, and auditor independence (Bukit & Iskandar, 2009; 
Klein, 2002, 2003; Larcker et al., 2007; Richardson et al., 2005; Romano, 2005; Siregar & 
Utama, 2008). Firm specific characteristics such as firm size, leverage and profitability have 
also been documented as determinants of discretionary accruals. Companies operating for a 
long period of time are expected to have improved corporate governance practices 
(Fasterling, 2005). Stakeholders, therefore, get the benefits of better monitoring activities. 
This chapter extends earlier research studies by incorporating company age and stock 
exchange listings as determinants of earnings management. Furthermore, this chapter also 
argues that a company operating for a long time under listing status reduces earnings 
management. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: section 3.2 gives an overview of earnings management 
models, and section 3.3 presents a literature review of earnings management and corporate 
governance. Hypotheses are developed in section 3.4. Section 3.5 and 3.6 explain the 
sampling process used and the research methodology followed. In section 3.7, univariate and 
multivariate analyses are discussed, which leads to section 3.8, the conclusion of the chapter.  
3.2 Earnings Management Models 
Earnings management is measured by accrual changes, change of accounting methods and 
change of capital structure (Jones, 1991). Most of the influential earnings management 
models are based on total accruals. The advantage of the accruals approach is that it can 
potentially reveal the subtle income-reducing techniques that managers have incentives to 
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employ since such techniques are less subject to detection by outsiders (DeAngleo, 1986). 
However, the total accruals measure has an important limitation: total accruals include both 
discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals, and if non-discretionary accruals are 
large relative to total accruals then discretionary accruals are a poor proxy for the extent of 
income manipulation by managers. Non-discretionary accruals can be large and 
systematically negative, even in the absence of income manipulation. Thus total accruals less 
than zero could generate an erroneous inference that managers had deliberately understated 
earnings. However, total accruals can validly be negative if depreciation was a major expense  
(DeAngleo, 1986). The following summarises are the well-recognised models of earnings 
management. 
3.2.1 The Healy Model 
Healy (1985) found earnings management by comparing average total accruals, scaled by 
lagged total assets. Total accruals are the proxy for discretionary accruals in his model. Total 
accruals are the difference between reported accounting earnings and cash flow from 
operations. Non-discretionary accruals are not zero, but total accruals are equal to 
discretionary accruals plus non-discretionary accruals. The mean total accruals from the 
estimation period then represent the measure of non-discretionary accruals. Healy (1985) 
developed an empirical approach that used the firm‟s operating cash flows as a proxy for 
what earnings would have been in the absence of managerial income manipulation. 
3.2.2  The DeAngelo Model 
DeAngelo (1986) tests for earnings management by computing the first difference in total 
accruals. She examined the accounting decisions made by managers and found that managers 
of the sample firms had incentives to manage earnings. The DeAngelo model calculates 
normal accruals as the previous period‟s accruals deflated by lagged assets. The DeAngelo 
model found marginally better accrual evidence than the Healy (1958) model due to serial 
correlation of sales innovation (Ronen & Yaari, 2007) 
3.2.3  The Jones Model 
Jones‟ (1991) accruals on event study implies that firms do not manage earnings before the 
event and relaxed the assumption of constant non-discretionary accruals. She included gross 
property, plant and equipment and the changes in revenue to control for changes in non-
discretionary accruals, while total accruals are considered as a change of working capital 
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accounts. The regression calculated three coefficients for reciprocal of assets, revenue 
accruals, and fixed asset accruals, and, notably, the expected sign of each coefficient is 
different. Property, plant and equipment is negative because it determines depreciation 
expense. The coefficient for the change of sales would be positive as changes in accounts 
receivable and accounts payable are related. Since the sales of a profitable firm exceeds 
expenses, the net working capital would be positive if the credit policy of the firm and 
suppliers are the same (Ronen & Yaari, 2007). For example, assume that the sales of a firm 
were made only in cash but a few purchases were on credit. Accounts payable would increase 
as sales increased, so the coefficient of change in sales is negative. The Jones model was 
developed from a small sample which increases the chance of type II error (i.e. erroneously 
accepting the null hypothesis that earnings management does not take place), but to some 
extent, small samples are unavoidable due to low observation trends (Ronen & Yaari, 2007). 
3.2.4 Modified Jones Model 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny (1995) established a total accruals model by considering the 
treatment of accounts receivable. They designed the modification to eliminate the conjectured 
tendency of the Jones Model to erroneously measure discretionary accruals when discretion is 
exercised over revenues. In the Modified Jones model, non-discretionary accruals are 
estimated during the event period 
The estimates of coefficients of accruals and non-discretionary accruals during the estimation 
period are those obtained from the original Jones Model with the sole adjustment relative to 
that model being the change in receivables. The Modified  Jones Model implicitly assumes 
that all changes in credit sales in the event period results from earnings management 
(Dechow et al., 1995). In cross section analysis, the change in the accounts receivable is 
subtracted from the change in revenues for the estimation of the parameters of normal 
accruals (Ronen & Yaari, 2007). 
3.2.5 Forward-Looking Model 
The forward-looking model was established by Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003) by 
combining three innovations: discretionary and non-discretionary accruals separation in 
credit sales, control of lagged accruals, and control of growth. In the first innovation, the 
Modified Jones Model assumes all sales in each period are discretionary and induces a 
positive correlation between discretionary accruals and current sales growth (Dechow et al., 
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2003). The second innovation was to include lagged accruals in the model since  some 
proportion of accruals can be predicted  based on last year‟s accruals (Dechow et al., 2003). 
Finally, the Forward-Looking Model included future sales growth because a growing firm, in 
anticipation of future sales, will rationally increase inventory balance. Thus the increase in 
inventory does not result from a management decision not to write-off obsolete inventories. 
The Jones Model classified an increase in inventory as earnings management while the 
Forward-Looking Model measures future growth pattern (Dechow et al., 2003). Dechow et 
al. (2003) measure growth of sales as the change in sales from the current year to the next 
year, scaled by current sales. Young firms are characterized by high growth and by high 
normal accruals (McNichols, 2000), so failure to take  account of  these features might lead to 
erroneously classifying non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. McNichols (2000) 
found discretionary accruals on the rate of returns on assets together with the growth variable 
yield a significant positive association between discretionary accruals and growth. 
3.2.6 Performance Matching Model 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) develop a performance-matching model which includes an 
intercept with the deflated lagged assets to mitigate hetroskedasticity. They find that having 
return on assets in the regression equation reduces discretionary accruals when they expect 
the null hypothesis of no earnings management to hold. This model has become quite popular 
because it yields stronger results than the Jones model (Ronen & Yaari, 2007). 
3.3 Literature Review 
The thread of earnings management essentially commenced in 1985 with the publication of 
Healy‟s research, closely followed by DeAngelo‟s research in 1986. Both of them focused on 
total accruals and changes in accruals as a measure of discretionary acts by management in 
order to manage earnings. Healy (1985) found that accrual policies of managers are related to 
bonus incentives in their employment contracts. However, DeAngelo (1986) found sharp 
contrast with Healy (1985), each of whom used accrual methodology and each of whom 
found evidence of income manipulation in a different setting. DeAngelo calculated non 
discretionary accruals based on lagged total accrual whereas Healy measured earnings based 
on comparing means of total accruals scaled by total assets. Both of these  researchers did not 
separate out non-discretionary factors – this first occurred when Jones (1991) used a  linear 
regression approach and controlled for  non-discretionary accrual factors including sales 
revenue and property, plant and equipment. 
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A different approach to earnings management research was introduced by McNicols and 
Wilson (1988) who focussed  on specific accruals within  industry settings. McNicols and 
Wilson (1988) modelled earnings management on a single accrual factor, the provision for 
bad debts, instead of collective factors of accruals using Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). Moyer (1990) examines the incentives for commercial bank managers to 
adjust accounting measures used by regulators and legislators. Petroni (1992) investigates the 
extent to which the biased application of accounting discretion by managers of 
property/casualty insurers affects the estimation error in claim loss reserves, finding that 
managers of financially weak insurance companies bias estimates of claim loss reserves 
downwards relative to financially strong insurers. 
The behaviour of earnings around a specified benchmark is another approach to earnings 
management research. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence that earnings 
management occurs in order to avoid reporting decreases in earnings or  losses. It has also 
been suggested that  earnings management occurs in order to  report positive profit, sustain 
recent performance, and meet analysts‟ forecasts, in that order (Degeorge, Patel, & 
Zeckhauser, 1999).  
Dechow, et al. (1995) introduced the  Modified Jones model, which has become one of the 
most widely-used models in earnings management research.  The Modified Jones model 
includes an adjustment to sales based on the change in the amount of receivables. Whereas 
the Jones model implicitly assumes that discretion is not exercised over revenue in either the 
estimation period or the event period, the Modified Jones model assumes that all changes in 
the credit sales in event period result from earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995). The 
Jones model focused on the manipulation of bad debt expenses but underestimates managed 
earnings when sales are manipulated. In contrast, the Modified Jones model overestimates the 
magnitude of earnings management (Ronen & Yaari, 2007). 
The following five sub-sections survey the relevant literature on regulation and corporate 
governance indicators related to earnings management. 
3.3.1 Regulation and Earnings Management 
Regulation is an important determinant of earnings management. Both voluntary and 
mandatory regulations increase disclosures to shareholders, reduce information asymmetry, 
and reduce managerial discretionary power to manage earnings. Disclosure of information 
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reduces the cost of capital and provides  higher earnings quality (Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 
2008). A weak legal environment might facilitate opportunistic earnings management, which 
results in lower earnings quality. Although  soft regulations strengthen the rights of  minority 
shareholders, they  cannot rely on the courts as legal processes remain slow and ineffective 
(Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000). They also found that earnings management is inversely 
related to the strength of the regulation and litigation environment. 
Stock market authorities have become increasingly anxious about the implementation of 
corporate governance regulations following many high profile corporate collapses and 
accounting manipulations that have occurred in recent years. Corporate governance 
regulations were introduced following the Cadbury Report in 1992 and, more recently, 
tightened in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, but recent literature suggests that corporate 
governance regulations are irrelevant and competing regulators implement irrespective of 
necessity (Romano, 2005). Nonetheless, this flow of regulation allows regulators to facilitate 
better policy and allows flexibility to the organizations as one code does not fit all sectors and 
companies. 
3.3.2 Board of Directors and Earnings Management 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) requires firms to use  accrual accounting, 
but this also allows management to control  the timing of accrual expenditures (Xie et al., 
2003). However, it is over to the board of directors to monitor and control these discretionary 
acts of management. Independent outside directors provide a measure of protection against 
this agency problem (Weisbach, 1988), so it is expected that the composition of the board 
will be a factor that influences the extent to which a company engages in earnings 
management since  independent outsider directors monitor management more effectively than 
inside directors (Vafeas, 2000; Xie et al., 2003). Unfortunately,  non-executive directors may 
not act as  good monitors if they have a significant financial interest in the company (Luan & 
Tang, 2007; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005; Tosi, Shen, & Gentry, 2003),  they have other 
directorships that compete for their time (i.e. they are too busy), they have limited time to 
devote to the affairs of the company, or they owe their positions to existing management and 
therefore their loyalty is more to that management than to the company (Hart, 1995). A large 
board may include a number of independent directors, but this may also result in greater 
bureaucracy and less functionality than a board that is numerically smaller. Nevertheless, a 
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large board with more independent directors is better positioned to prevent earnings 
management (Xie et al., 2003). 
3.3.3 Board Committees and Earnings Management 
Vance (1983) argues that the audit committee, the compensation committee and the 
nomination committee all have significant influence on corporate activities while Klein 
(2003) argues that the overall composition of the board of directors has no influence on firm 
performance, but that the audit committee does. It is therefore likely that the structure of 
board committees and their composition will impact management‟s willingness to manage 
earnings. Xie et al. (2003) argue that the executive committee only plays an indirect role 
whereas the audit committee has a more direct role in controlling earnings management. 
Consequently, an active, well-structured and properly functioning audit committee may be 
able to reduce if not eliminate earnings management. It is therefore expected that 
professionally efficient audit committee members will play a significant role in preventing 
earnings management, and that an audit committee comprising a large proportion of 
independent directors will ensure effective monitoring. This expectation is in line with the  
recommendations of Levitt‟s Blue Ribbon Panel (Xie et al., 2003). The Cadbury Report 
(1992) also suggests that the audit and remuneration committee should be comprised mainly 
or entirely of non-executive directors. 
3.3.4 Auditor and Earnings Management 
Prior research also shows that auditor and audit quality play an important role regarding the 
control of earnings management (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; Siregar & Utama, 2008; 
Teoh & Wong, 1993). They also argue that the Big 4 auditors have greater independence 
from the client as compared to non Big 4 auditors. Companies audited by Big 4 firms have 
less discretionary accruals than others because the auditors play a significant role in 
constraining opportunistic earnings management behaviour. However, the auditor‟s ability to 
be independent is influenced by the incentives they receive, and a recent study has  
investigated whether non-audit services compromise auditor independence or whether the 
consequences are that the auditor allows pernicious earnings management (Cahan, Emanuel, 
Hay, & Wong, 2008; Habib & Islam, 2007). 
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3.3.5 Ownership Concentration, Securities Exchange Listing and Earnings 
Management 
Management stockholding reduces agency conflicts because they are both a principal (since 
they are shareholders in their own right) and an agent (for the other shareholders). It is 
therefore expected that this dual role should result in a lower incidence of earnings 
management.  Previous studies have found a  negative relationship between management 
shareholding and the absolute value of abnormal accruals (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1998). 
Healy (1985) found that CEO‟s  tend to manage earnings to maximise their bonus while 
Klein (2002) found CEO shareholdings to be no predictor of earnings management. 
Institutional ownership provides  wider monitoring and greater control of firm information 
and reduces earnings management (Hermes, Postma, & Zivkov, 2007; Siregar & Utama, 
2008). 
3.4 Hypothesis Development 
Five hypotheses are developed in order to test the association between corporate governance 
and discretionary accruals. 
3.4.1 Regulations and Earnings Management 
The basic premise of capitalism is that individuals pursue their own interest (Smith, 1776). 
Appropriate corporate laws and regulations are vital for the efficient working of a capitalistic 
economy in order to maximise individual and national wealth. There is a widespread belief 
that only  strict laws and regulatory controls can prevent management acting for their own 
self-interest (Drobetz, 2002). However, an appropriate legal structure may help to protect 
investors and their investments, and also ensures a „proper‟ environment that generates a 
return on investment. Corporate governance regulations should lead to improved systems of 
internal control within companies. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) examined systematic 
differences of earnings management and found a negative relationship between corporate 
governance regulations and the level of earnings management . Leuz et al. (2003) argue that 
insiders have incentives to conceal their private control benefits from outsiders. 
Prior research also found that financial disclosure practices have a positive impact on investor 
confidence, reduce information asymmetry, and  result in a lower cost of capital (Francis et 
al., 2008). Similarly, corporate governance and other regulations help management to 
structure strong internal control systems and monitor shareholders‟ interest. Tightening rules 
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and regulations and the adoption of  self regulation by market participants, are the result of 
the growing conviction that better corporate governance will deliver higher shareholder value 
(Bartle & Vass, 2007; Drobetz, 2002). Increased regulation enhances strong corporate 
governance, and together with a more independent and effective board of directors and board 
committees, leads to a reduction in managerial discretionary decisions resulting in earnings 
manipulation. The first regulation-related hypothesis, expressed in the null form is therefore: 
01:H There is no relationship between the presence of corporate governance regulations and 
discretionary accruals.  
3.4.2 Corporate Governance Compliance and Earnings Management 
An effective and efficient board of directors is the prime component in a system of corporate 
governance. However, if the board is dominated by executive directors, the opportunity to 
indulge in „discretionary financial decisions‟ will be greater than if the board was dominated 
by independent directors. Similarly, CEO duality, where the CEO is also the chair of the 
board of directors, further creates an environment that enables discretionary decisions 
concerning the management of earnings. It is suggested that the use of appropriate board 
committees such as an audit committee, remuneration committee, and a nomination 
committee, will act to reduce discretionary managerial decisions. For example, having at least 
one independent director with financial expertise on the audit committee will enhance the 
level of corporate governance, which, in turn, should reduce discretionary accruals. Similar 
arguments can be mounted for having independent directors on the remuneration committee 
(since they will then be able to rationalise the remuneration and incentives offered to 
management), and on the nomination committee (to remove the possibility of nepotistic 
appointments). 
The results of empirical research suggest that outside directors are able to more effectively 
monitor and reduce agency costs, which results in lower discretionary accruals (Jiang, Lee, & 
Anandarajan, 2008; Klein, 2002; Vance, 1983). Similarly, effective and independent board 
committees are expected to monitor internal control systems better. All of these attributes of 
best practice generally form part of a robust set of corporate governance regulations, so 
compliance with these regulations should strengthen the level of corporate governance. This 
leads to the following null hypothesis related to corporate governance compliance: 
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0 2 :H  There is no relationship between the level of compliance with corporate governance 
regulation and discretionary accruals. 
3.4.3 Control Shareholding and Earnings Management 
A zero-based agency cost indicates that the firm is owned by a single owner-manager. 
Agency costs exist when ownership is separated from management, i.e. when the manager 
holds less than 100 percent of the equity. Agency costs increase with the reduction in the 
proportion of managerial ownership. Companies that operate with a controlling shareholder 
have less independent decision-making compared to companies where there is no controlling 
shareholder, since the controlling shareholder has access to information and, by definition, 
controls the activities and decisions of the board of directors (Varma, Patel, & Naidu, 2009). 
Minority shareholders have little or no influence on board decisions, and may feel insecure 
when the corporate environment is not regulated. Independent management have better 
control over decision-making if the shareholding is scattered among many owners. Therefore, 
a non-mandatory corporate governance regulatory environment may not be sufficient to 
protect minority shareholders. This leads to the following null hypothesis concerning a 
controlling shareholder:  
03:H  There is no relationship between the presence of a controlling shareholder and 
discretionary accruals.  
3.4.4 Business Operation Tenure and Earnings Management 
A company operating in society is expected to have a robust system of internal control and to 
comply with relevant regulations (Kole & Lehn, 1997). As discussed previously, effective 
systems of controlling and monitoring management lead to a reduction in discretionary 
accruals. It can be argued that a mature company that has been operating for a period of time 
will have such systems in place, and that its stakeholders will be actively monitoring the 
financial position of the business. This argument is supported, at least in part, by prior 
research which provides evidence that growing and newly established firms have more 
discretionary accruals than mature firms (McNichols & Wilson, 1988; Shen & Chih, 2007). 
However, all firms, irrespective of maturity, could manage their earnings – for example, 
Dechow & Dichev (2002) show that longer operating cycles generate greater uncertainty, 
give rise to more estimation errors, and result in lower quality of accruals. Thus the evidence 
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regarding the relationship between the maturity of the company and earnings management is 
mixed. The current research will provide further evidence about this relationship, so the 
fourth null hypothesis is as follows: 
0 4 :H  There is no relationship between business operating tenure and discretionary accruals. 
3.4.5 Listing Tenure and Earnings Management 
The New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Rules and the Corporate Governance Best Practice 
Code 2004 both provide criteria with which listed companies must or should (respectively) 
comply. Compliance with these criteria should result in an environment whereby 
opportunities for earnings management will be limited. It is therefore expected that the longer 
a company has been listed, the more likely they will have a lower level of discretionary 
accruals.  Hypothesis five, expressed in the null form, is therefore:  
05:H  There is no relationship between the listing tenure of a company and discretionary 
accruals. 
In essence, the hypothesis posits that a regulated environment of corporate governance will 
reduce discretionary accruals by imposing more accountable and effective monitoring 
systems.   
3.5 Sample  
The sample of companies for this study is selected from companies listed by the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange Limited (NZX). The NZX comprises two markets: the New Zealand 
Stock Market (NZSE) (the main board) where premium equities are traded, and the New 
Zealand Alternative Market (NZAX) which lists companies that are comparatively new and, 
typically, in a rapid growth phase. The latter market allows these young companies to issue 
equities comparatively cheaply as compared to the main board. It should be noted that 
corporate governance research in New Zealand has not previously included the NZAX 
companies because this board is a recent addition to the market. The inclusion of the NZAX 
should therefore add depth to the previous studies of corporate governance in New Zealand.  
The sample period covers the years from 2000 to 2007, inclusive. To be included in the 
sample, companies must have operated over the entire period of the study. By the end of 
August, 2008 a total of 153 companies were listed by NZX. Consistent with previous 
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research, twenty nine finance companies were excluded since they are subject to different 
regulations and reporting procedures. Thirty five companies did not provide a complete set of 
financial reports usable for this research while financial information about nineteen 
companies was not available. 
Corporate governance information such as the composition of the board of directors, the 
board committees, and audit information was collected manually from IRG Ltd‟s deep 
archive section while financial data was collected from DATASTREAM. Company websites 
also provided information about operating cycles and the length of time that the company had 
been listed on the stock exchange. The final sample of seventy companies was then divided 
into different industry sectors using the NZX categories, as follows: 
Table 9: Sector composition of sample 
Sector Group Companies Observation Percentage 
Energy 8 64 11.43% 
Goods 11 88 15.71% 
Investment 5 40 7.14% 
Primary 9 72 12.86% 
Property 5 40 7.14% 
Service 32 256 45.72% 
Total 70 560 100% 
 
3.6 Research Methodology 
This section describes the research methodology, including the measurement of the research 
variables and the statistical techniques and other models used in this research. 
3.6.1  Measurement of Variables 
This section describes how the dependent and independent variables were measured and how 
discretionary accruals were calculated. 
3.6.1.1 Measure of Dependent Variable 
Discretionary accruals were measured using Jones Model (1991), the Modified Jones Model 
(1995) and the Performance Matched Model (Kothari, 2005). Free cash flow was used to 
measure the performance matched model as follows: 
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Where: 
 
Total Accruals = Net Income before extraordinary items less Free Cash Flow which includes 
cash flow from   operating activities and cash flow from investing activities 
0   = constant 
ipREV  = revenue in year t less revenue in year p-1 for firm  
ipAR  = receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1 for firm i 
itPPE   = gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i 
1itA   = total assets in year t-1 for firm i 
i  = individual firm 
 p  = period 
it   = error term in year t for firm i 
ipNDA  = non-discretionary accruals 
1ipROA  = lagged rate of return on assets 
3.6.1.2. Measure of Independent Variables 
3.6.1.2.1 Regulation 
The regulation effect will be measured by a dummy variable since it is anticipated that 
corporate governance regulations will enhance corporate governance compliance and reduce 
opportunistic behaviour of management. The opportunistic behaviour of management is 
indicated by discretionary accruals, so, for the years 2000-2003, the regulation dummy 
variable will be „0‟ to indicate the existence of discretionary accruals when there were no 
regulations, otherwise the regulation dummy variable will be „1‟. It is expected that there will 
be a negative correlation between the regulation dummy variable and discretionary accruals. 
3.6.1.2.2 Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 
A Corporate Governance Index (CGI) was prepared for each company using the approach 
specified in chapter 2. 
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3.6.1.2.3. Control Shareholding 
If one entity holds at least half of the issued shares, they are considered to have the 
controlling shareholding of the company. Companies having a more concentrated ownership 
are more likely to have higher discretionary accruals as compared to companies with less 
concentrated ownership. The controlling shareholder has access to more information and, by 
definition, can control the company‟s governance processes and internal control systems. 
This variable will be coded „1‟ if the company has a controlling shareholder, „0‟ otherwise. It 
is expected that there will be a positive relationship between this variable and discretionary 
accruals. 
3.6.1.2.4 NZX Listing Tenure 
Companies that are listed on the stock exchange are subject to higher monitoring by investors 
and regulators. It is expected that all stakeholders would access news releases from the 
company as and when they occur, which suggests that it would be more difficult for such 
companies to have discretionary accruals. It is posited that the longer a company has been 
listed, the less likelihood that there will be discretionary accruals. It is expected that there will 
be a negative relationship between this variable and discretionary accruals. 
3.6.1.2.5. Operating Tenure 
Company operating age and discretionary accruals have an inconclusive relationship. Older 
companies are expected to have stable internal control mechanisms which should lead to 
lower discretionary accruals. However, a company that is in its early phase of its life is 
always likely to have more discretionary accruals than a mature company. Thus it is posited 
that as the age of business operation increases the possibility of discretionary accruals 
decreases. On the other hand, it can be argued that companies that have been in the market 
for a long time may not be too concerned about the reaction of the market to news about the 
existence of discretionary accruals. In this case there would be a positive association between 
the age of the company and discretionary accruals. 
3.6.1.3. Measurement of Control variables 
3.6.1.3.1 Leverage 
Leverage indicates business risk in terms of external financing. A company with more 
leverage indicates higher debt contribution in terms of its financial structure. A firm that has 
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higher leverage is more likely to have higher discretionary accruals in order to manage their 
external financing and to show a better asset structure with higher revenue performance. 
Leverage is therefore considered a control variable in the multivariate equation (Bradbury, 
Mak, & Tan, 2006). 
3.6.1.3.2 Return on Assets (ROA) 
Return on assets is the indicator of financial performance of an organisation as it reflects how 
effectively and efficiently the resources are being utilised. It is expected that companies with 
higher ROA have lower discretionary accruals, and that there will be a negative relationship 
with discretionary accruals. 
3.6.1.3.3 Firm Size 
Controlling for firm size is common in earnings management research. It is expected that a 
large firm will have relatively higher discretionary accruals compared to a small firm since a 
large firm generally will have diversified or decentralised management decision-making. A 
diversified decision-making process leads to higher discretionary accruals for business. It is 
expected that there is a positive relationship between firm size and discretionary accruals. 
3.6.1.4 Sector Dummy Measure 
To evaluate the business sector effect, a sector dummy variable was considered to be 
relevant. Following the NZX index categories, all samples were divided into 6 different 
sectors to obtain representative samples for each sector. The sectors are: service, primary, 
energy, goods, property and investment. From these sectors, the service sector was used as 
the intercept for regression analysis to avoid the dummy variable trap (Gujarati, 2003). 
Information existing on the same sector is categorised as „1‟ and otherwise „0‟ for sector 
dummy. 
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3.6.2  Multivariate Regression Model 
Considering all above explanatory variables the following general multivariate regression 
model was prepared: 
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Where, 
itDAC   = Discretionary Accruals (Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, 
Performance Matched Model, Performance Matched Free Cash 
Flow Model); 
Re _ itg Dummy   = Regulation Dummy; 
tCGI    = Corporate Governance Index in year t; 
tContShr    = Control Shareholding in year t; 
tNZXListTen   = NZX Listing Tenure in year t; 
 tOperatingTen  = Operating Tenure in year t; 
 tLeverage    = Leverage in year t; 
tROA    = Return on Assets in year t; 
1tTA    = Total Assets in year (t-1) as a proxy of firm size; 
 
5
1
_ tDummySector  = Sector Dummy for 1, 2 … 5; 
     = Coefficient of respective variables 1, 2 …15; 
i     = Individual firm; 
t     = Year; and 
     = Error term. 
This model was used for all the measurements of discretionary accruals calculation in the 
next section. Discretionary accruals are the dependent variable used to measure managerial 
opportunistic behaviour impact on earnings. 
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3.7 Results 
The objective of this chapter was to investigate the effect of corporate governance regulations 
on managerial accruals (discretionary accruals) in New Zealand listed companies. First the 
results of descriptive statistics are presented then, in the following sections, results of 
correlation analysis; abnormal accruals and multivariate analysis are illustrated. 
3.7.1  Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the key variables are presented in table 10. This table shows a 
descriptive analysis pre and post regulation, including the total sample of different variables. 
Average discretionary accruals for Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, Performance 
Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model different models are close 
to zero, implying the average descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals did not provide 
any concrete evidence. Total accruals were mainly captured by sales and fixed assets like 
property plant and equipment scaling. Discretionary accruals were captured on the 
unexplained variable of the regression which descriptive statistics evidenced with the value 
consistent in all the models of accrual measure. Average corporate governance compliance 
increased from 0.52 to 0.55 as a regulatory impact. The average operating tenure of business 
is 28 years whereas average listing tenure, significantly less at 12 years, implies that firms 
take time to list on the stock exchange after incorporation. The average listing years indicates 
that firms listed in the capital market at the growth level of business. 
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Table 10: Descriptive Analysis 
Details Mean Median Standard Deviation 
 
Pre-Regulation Post-Regulation All Sample Pre-Regulation Post-Regulation All Sample Pre-Regulation Post-Regulation All Sample 
Discretionary Accruals – Jones Model -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.019 0.012 0.268 0.141 0.214 
Discretionary Accruals – Modified Jones Model -0.005 0.018 0.00648 0.007 0.018 0.0136 0.278 0.140 0.22053 
Discretionary Accruals – Performance Matched Model 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.002 -0.00385 0.196 0.122 0.16268 
Discretionary Accruals – Performance Matched Free Cash Flow 
Model 
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.099 0.178 0.141 1.800 1.666 1.733 
Regulation Dummy 0.000 1.000 0.5 0.000 1.000 0.5 0.000 0.000 0.5 
Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 0.519 0.554 0.536 0.500 0.550 0.5 0.120 0.126 0.124 
CGI * Regulation Dummy 0.000 0.554 0.277 0.000 0.550 0.15 0.000 0.126 0.291 
Listing Tenure 12.057 16.046 14.052 8.000 12.000 10 11.505 11.558 11.693 
Operating Tenure 28.700 32.707 30.704 16.000 20.000 18 34.265 34.261 34.291 
Return on Assets 0.058 0.087 0.072 0.096 0.100 0.099 0.426 0.321 0.377 
Total Assets (t-1) 2706993 1741694 2224343 120109 192802 145571.5 18895582 6008815 14016282 
Primary Sector 0.000 0.157 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.365 0.269 
Energy Sector 0.000 0.129 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.335 0.245 
Goods Sector 0.000 0.071 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.258 0.186 
Property Sector 0.000 0.114 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.319 0.232 
Investment Sector 0.000 0.071 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.258 0.186 
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Table 11: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Jones Discretionary Accruals (1) 1 0.987** 0.745 -0.201* 0.062 -0.079* 0.051 -.007 0.032 -0.002 -0.028 .323** 0.010 -0.024 0.014 0.017 0.036 -0.012 
Modified Jones Discretionary 
Accruals (2) 
 1 .738** -.191** 0.054 -.087* 0.043 -0.016 0.024 0 0.02 .369** 0.01 0.022 0.014 0.017 0.039 -0.004 
Performance Matched 
Discretionary Accruals (3) 
  1 -.259** 0.00 -0.026 -0.01 -0.028 0.013 -.108* 0.042 0.005 -0.019 0.039 -0.035 -0.02 -0.036 0.032 
Free Cash Flow Discretionary 
Accruals (4) 
   1 0.00 -.109** -0.032 0.043 0.018 .216** -.124** -0.009 0.016 .126** 0.033 0.000 -0.001 0.064 
Regulation Dummy (5)     1 .140** .952** 0.028 .171** 0.058 0.062 0.039 -0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Corporate Governance Index (6)      1 .351** 0.005 .119** .089* 0.002 -.163** -0.002 -.152** .116** -.084* -.184** -.171** 
Interaction of CGI and 
REGDUMMY (7) 
      1 0.026 .182** 0.072 0.031 0.015 -0.04 -0.026 0.027 -0.01 -0.041 -0.036 
Controlling Shareholdings (8)        1 -.108* 0.021 -.151** -0.028 .097* -.089* -.104* -.108* .183** -.170** 
NZX Listing Tenure (9)         1 .258** -0.052 -0.045 -.095* 0.063 0.053 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 
Business Operating Tenure (10)          1 -.164** 0.043 .112** -.180** .214** -.113** 0.023 -.112** 
Leverage (11)           1 0.021 -0.025 -0.056 -0.038 -0.045 .176** -0.012 
Return On Assets (12)            1 0.014 -.095* 0.067 0.064 .149** 0.037 
Total Assets (13)             1 -0.053 .160** -0.02 -0.015 -0.027 
Primary Sector (14)              1 -.166** -.120** -.155** -.120** 
Energy Sector (15)               1 -.107* -.138** -.107* 
Goods Sector (16)                1 -.100* -0.077 
Property Sector (17)                 1 -.100* 
Investment Sector (18)                  1 
***  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  
**       Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*         Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
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3.7.2  Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis was conducted to find the relationship strength among independent and 
dependent variables. Table 11, the Correlation Matrix, shows all the models of total accruals 
measurement and independent variable relationships. None of the independent variables have 
steady unique correlation with discretionary accruals in all models. The Jones model has 
significant correlation with the corporate governance index (r = -0.079 at the 10% level) and 
return on assets (r = 0.323, at the 1% level). The modified Jones model is correlated with the 
same variables as corporate governance index (r = -0.087) with 5% level of significance and 
return on assets (r = 0.369) with 1% level of significance. In both cases, the corporate 
governance index has a negative relationship with discretionary accruals, indicating that better 
corporate governance practice reduces discretionary accruals as a proxy of earnings 
management. 
Companies‟ performance as ROA having a positive relationship with discretionary accruals 
indicates that higher performing companies show statistically significant higher discretionary 
accruals. McNichols (2000) also claims that Jones and Modified Jones Models of 
discretionary accruals have positive relationships with ROA. The performance matched 
discretionary accruals model is correlated with business operating tenure (r =-0.108) only. 
Finally, the free cash flow discretionary accruals model correlated with the corporate 
governance index (r = -0.109), business operating tenure (r = 0.216), leverage (r = -0.124) 
and primary sector (r = 0.126) at 5% level of significance. The correlation coefficient was 
checked for higher collinearity among regressors. It can be seen from the correlation matrix 
that there is no high correlation among variables. As a result, collinearity is no threat to the 
independence of regression reported in the following sections. 
3.7.3  Abnormal Accruals 
This section explains the overall accruals measurement and explanatory power of 
Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model Three other established accruals measurement 
models were also calculated to compare with our model (Performance Matched Free Cash 
Flow Model) in explaining coefficients. Table 12 shows the explanatory power of all models. 
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Table 12: Coefficient of accruals model 
Models 
Adjusted 
R
2 
Intercept 
Total Assets 
Reciprocal 
Revenue 
Coefficient 
Property Plant and 
Equipment 
Coefficient 
ROA 
coefficient 
Jones Model 
0.204  
(48.861)*** 
-922.871  
(-8.856)*** 
0.03 
(8.974)*** 
0.019 
(1.803)** 
 - -  
Modified Jones Model 
0.201  
(48.014)*** 
-925.144  
(-8.859)*** 
0.03  
(8.840)*** 
0.02  
(1.880)** 
 - -  
Performance Matched Model 
0.316  
(65.429)*** 
0.025  
(1.846)* 
-859.579  
(-8.578)*** 
0.029 
(9.298)*** 
-0.034  
(-2.688)** 
0.282 
(9.592)*** 
Performance Matched Free 
Cash Flow Model 
0.228  
(42.193)*** 
-0.355  
(-3.121)** 
-8762.579 
(-10.223)*** 
0.006  
(0.239)* 
-0.008  
(-0.072) 
1.709 
(6.792)*** 
* Correlation significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)  
** Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
*** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 12 shows that the Jones Model (1991) and Modified Jones Model (1995) both have 
almost 20% explanatory power of at the  1% significant level. Moreover, all the determinants 
are statistically significant as total assets reciprocals and revenue coefficients. The 
performance matched model (2005) has 31.6% explanatory power at 1% level of significance. 
The determinants of the performance matched model; total assets reciprocal, revenue 
coefficient, property plant and equipment coefficient and ROA coefficients are statistically 
significant. Finally, the performance matched free cash flow model has 22.8% explanatory 
power with 1% level of significance. Performance matched free cash flow model determinants 
such as total assets reciprocal, revenue coefficient and ROA coefficient are statistically 
significant, except property plant and equipment is significant at more than the 10% level of 
significance. 
Table 13, shows the signs of regression for each of the variables in all models. Following 
basic accrual measurement process, revenue and fixed assets measurement is the key to 
calculating non-discretionary accruals. The coefficient of change in sales is positive because 
the sales of a profitable firm exceed its expenses and the net working capital will be positive 
if the credit policies of the firm and suppliers are similar. Conversely the coefficient on 
property, plant and equipment is negative because it determines the depreciation expenses 
(Ronen & Yaari, 2007). 
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Table 13: Regressor’s Sign & Coefficients on Each of the Model and Variables 
Details 
Expected 
Sign 
Jones Model 
Modified Jones 
Model 
Performance 
Matched Model 
Performance Matched 
Free Cash Flow Model 
Total Accruals +/- 
(Positive: 222; 
Negative: 338) 
(Positive: 218; 
Negative: 342) 
(Positive: 219; 
Negative: 341) 
(Positive: 270; Negative: 
290) 
Reciprocals of Assets 
Coefficient 
? - - - - 
Revenue & Receivables 
Coefficient 
+ 
+(Positive: 390; 
Negative:170) =30.36% 
+(Positive: 409; 
Negative:151) 
=26.96% 
+ (Positive: 391; 
Negative:169) 
= 30.18% 
+(Positive: 390; Negative: 
170) 
= 30.36% 
Property, Plant and 
Equipment Coefficient 
- + + - - 
Performance Indicator 
(ROA) coefficient 
? Not Applicable Not Applicable 
+ (Positive: 458; 
Negative: 102) 
= 18.21% 
+(Positive: 458; 
Negative: 102) 
= 18.21% 
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Table 13 shows that 30.36% of individual regressors (revenue receivables coefficient –„ve 
170) have negative values in the Jones Model and the overall coefficient is positive as 
expected, whereas Jones (1991) found in 39% of the regressions the coefficient of change in 
sales are negative.  Similarly, the Modified Jones (1995) Model has 26.96% and the  
Performance Matched (Kothari et al., 2005) Model has 30.18% negative change in sales 
coefficients. The Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model also shows 30.36% of sales 
coefficients are negative, which is comparatively stronger than the Jones Model, Modified 
Jones Model and Performance Matched Model. Property, plant and equipment was expecting 
a negative coefficient, however, the Jones and Modified Jones Model both found positive 
coefficients with accruals unlike the Performance Matched and Performance Matched Free 
Cash Flow model. This change is a significant improvement in the Performance Matched Free 
Cash Flow Model and evidenced that higher returns on assets generate higher income 
changing accruals. The performance indicator coefficient, ROA, shows 18.21% of negative 
individual regressors with positive coefficients, which indicates profit increasing accruals. 
3.7.4 Multivariate Analysis 
This section presents the results of multivariate regression for all the significant methods of 
the study, including expected coefficient directions of variables. Jones‟ model is the pioneer 
of accruals calculation, followed by the Modified Jones model, where our analysis found that, 
among all variables, the Modified Jones model has more significant effects on NZX listing 
tenure, business operating tenure and Return on Assets (ROA), with the 2R  value marginally 
higher in the Modified Jones Model (20.6%) compared to the Jones Model (19.8%) for these 
variables. The Fisher test shows both models are significant at a 1% level with acceptable 
levels of Durbin-Watson value reflecting no auto correlation in the model. As a rule of thumb, 
a Durbin-Watson test value lower than 2 is an acceptable level of auto correlation in the 
model. 
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Table 14: Multivariate Analysis of the determinant of Discretionary Accruals 
Variables Jones Model 
Modified Jones 
Model 
Performance Matched 
Model 
Performance Matched Free Cash 
Flow Model 
C 
0.006 
(0.274) 
0.015 
(0.708) 
0.022 
(0.197) 
0.147 
(0.0828) 
Regulation Dummy 
0.004 
(0.155) 
-0.005 
(.182) 
0.021 
(0.861) 
0.523 
(2.501)** 
Corporate Governance 
Index 
-0.043 
(-1.230) 
-0.054 
(-1.527) 
-0.038 
(-1.178) 
-0.757 
(-2.42)*** 
Corporate Governance 
Index * Regulation Dummy 
0.020 
(0.434) 
0.031 
(0.688) 
-0.033 
(-0.769) 
-0.701 
(-1.800)* 
Control Shareholder 
-0.003 
(-0.430) 
-0.005 
(-0.760) 
-0.005 
(-0.879) 
0.360 
(5.925)*** 
Listing Tenure 
0.001 
(2.885)*** 
0.001 
(2.456)** 
0.001 
(3.712)*** 
-0.005 
(-2.300)** 
Operating Tenure 
-0.001 
(-3.012)*** 
-0.001 
(-2.905)*** 
-0.001 
(-5.70)*** 
0.005 
(4.496)*** 
Leverage 
0.006 
(0.459) 
-0.001 
(-0.038) 
0.017 
(1.338) 
0.028 
(0.257) 
Return on Assets 
0.208 
(9.036) 
0.233 
(9.609)*** 
0.021 
(1.178) 
-0.588 
(-3.878)*** 
Total Assets (t-1) 
0.000 
(1.103) 
0.000 
(1.086) 
0.000 
(-0.250) 
0.000 
(0.120) 
Primary Sector Dummy 
-0.004 
(-0.344) 
-0.002 
(-0.179) 
-0.018 
(-1.954)* 
0.454 
(5.668)*** 
Energy Sector Dummy 
-0.004 
(-0.519) 
-0.005 
(-0.643) 
-0.006 
(-0.745) 
0.270 
(3.158)*** 
Goods Sector Dummy 
0.003 
(0.246) 
-0.001 
(-0.092) 
-0.027 
(-2.199)** 
0.315 
(3.020)*** 
Property Sector Dummy 
-0.003 
(-0.308) 
-0.004 
(-0.398) 
-0.018 
(-2.113)** 
-0.025 
(-0.289) 
Investment Sector Dummy 
-0.030 
(-2.299) 
-0.028 
(-0.917)* 
-0.010 
(-1.027) 
0.290 
(2.884)** 
R-squared 0.198 0.206 0.116 0.171 
Adjusted R-squared 0.177 0.186 0.093 0.149 
S.E. of regression 0.197 0.199 0.159 1.429 
F-statistic 9.597 10.119 5.115 8.000 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.327 1.292 1.547 1.711 
* Correlation significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Sample companies were categorised by 6 sectors, therefore 5 sector dummy variables are used 
in analysis. Only the service sector has no dummy to avoid the dummy variable trap which is 
the situation of perfect collinearity (Gujarati, 2003). In other words, ( 1 ) represents the 
intercept of the service sector and ,11 ,12 ,13 ,14 and ,15  are the differential intercept 
coefficients reflecting the intercept of other sectors (Goods, Primary, Property, Energy and 
Investment). 
Performance Matched Model regression found NZX listing tenure, Operating tenure, Goods, 
Property and Energy sector are statistically significant. This model has comparatively lower 
2R  with a predictive value of 11.6% at the 1% significance level. Moreover, a Durbin-Watson 
test value of 1.547 indicates no auto correlation in the model. 
Finally, the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model shows relatively higher significance 
of variables
6
. The coefficient of regulation dummy for the Jones Model, Modified Jones 
Model, Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model is 
respectively 0.004, -0.005, 0.021 and 0.523. Of all the models, The Performance Matched 
Free Cash Flow Model has significance at the 5% level. As mentioned above, regulations 
have a positive impact on earnings management and H01 is not rejected for the Jones Model, 
Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model. However, 
the Modified Jones model alone shows a negative coefficient. It indicates that the existence of 
regulation reduces earnings management opportunity. In other words, a more regulated 
company environment minimizes the opportunistic behaviour of management. 
Firms with higher corporate governance compliance have reduced opportunistic management 
attitudes which ensure higher accountability and reporting quality (Aguilera, 2005; Sinha, 
2006). The coefficients of the corporate governance index for the Jones Model, Modified 
Jones Model, Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model 
are -0.043, -0.054, -0.038 and -0.757 respectively. The entire set of coefficients indicates a 
negative association of the corporate governance index with discretionary accruals; indicate 
higher compliance of corporate governance reduces managerial accruals. Performance 
Matched Free Cash Flow Model has statistical significance at 1% level. The interaction 
                                                 
6
 Bradbury et al. (2006) found adjusted 
2R  = 0.075 to 0.089 at the 1% level of significance using different 
specifications of Modified Jones Model (1995).  
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coefficient of the corporate governance index and regulation dummy (Corporate Governance 
Index * Regulation dummy) shows an expected negative association for both the Performance 
Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model as -0.033 and -0.701 (at 
10% level of significance); however, the Jones Model and Modified Jones Model have 
positive coefficients of 0.020 and 0.031 with more than a 10% level of significance. 
Compliant corporate governance ensures independent boards, audit processes and strong 
internal control systems which reduce managerial discretion. H02 is thus rejected and 
indicates that higher corporate governance compliance with regulation reduces discretionary 
accruals. In summary, H01 and H02, results indicate that the existence of corporate 
governance regulation alone does not reduce managerial opportunistic behaviour but 
regulation with higher compliance of corporate governance does reduce managerial 
discretion. 
The coefficient for Control Shareholdings in the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow 
Model is calculated as 0.360, statistically significant at a 1% level. However, the coefficient 
for the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model 
is calculated as -0.003, -0.005 and -0.005 respectively, at more than a 10% level of statistical 
significance. The positive association of discretionary accruals and control shareholdings is 
consistent with the rejection of H03, suggesting that concentrated ownership holds significant 
control over management incurring discretionary accruals (Bradbury et al., 2006). Control 
shareholders have significant influence in selecting directors and CEOs of firms which 
indirectly influence managerial discretion.  
The coefficients of firm operating tenure for the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, 
Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Models are -0.001, -
0.001, -0.001 and 0.005 respectively. Firm operating tenure is statistically significant at the 
1% level for each of the models. Firms operating for longer terms having higher discretionary 
accruals were supported in rejecting H04.  
The coefficient of the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, and Performance Matched 
Models for listing tenure is 0.001 each while the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow 
Models shows 0.005. Moreover, stock exchange listing tenure is statistically significant at a 
5% level for both the Modified Jones Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow 
Model, and similarly, at a 1% level of significance for the Jones Model and Performance 
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Matched Model. As argued, stock exchange listing tenure has statistically significant negative 
associations in the performance matched model rejected H05. 
Performance indicator Returns on Assets has a negative coefficient of -0.588 for the 
Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model with 1% level significance and the Modified 
Jones Model has a coefficient of 0.233 at that level. However, the Jones Model and 
Performance Matched Model do not have any statistical significance with discretionary 
accruals. The negative association indicates that high performance reduces managerial 
discretion: managers are still de-motivated when they meet targeted performance. However, 
leverage and firm size do not show any statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Among NZX listed companies; primary, energy and goods sectors show statistical 
significance at a 1% level in the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model. Similarly, the 
Investment sector shows a 5% level of significance in the same Model. The Performance 
Matched Model shows significance in the primary sector at a 10% level; goods and property 
sector returns a 5% level of significance.  The Modified Jones Model indicates a 10% level of 
significance for the investment sector only. However, none of the sectors result in statistical 
significance for the Jones Model. Therefore, compared with four measures of discretionary 
accruals, the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model reflects more significance in a 
sectoral analysis of managerial discretion. Finally, the existing interaction between corporate 
governance and regulation suggest a negative coefficient, as expected. This implies that 
existing regulations enhance corporate governance compliance that subsequently reduces 
discretionary accruals. 
3.8 Conclusions and Remarks 
This chapter expands the stream of earnings management model using discretionary accruals, 
implementing free cash flow and documenting that firms demonstrating higher compliance of 
corporate governance have relatively lower discretionary accruals. The free cash flow 
measure is one of the very few observable inputs available in discretionary accruals models. 
Earnings management literature evidenced that accruals models are suitable for explanation 
using cash flow type operating activities. The results depict corporate governance compliance 
increasing the accountability of management and reducing financial discretion in decision 
making. Moreover, New Zealand Stock Exchange listed companies are compelled to follow 
corporate governance regulation and provide better monitoring of earnings with consequently 
lower discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals reduce relatively in growing firms and 
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those in the initial stage of operation. Managerial discretion reduces as corporate governance 
regulation compliance increases and minimizes discretionary accruals. This chapter finds 
evidence consistent with the proposition that firms complying with corporate governance 
regulation have more efficient monitoring compared to low compliance firms. 
An additional contribution of this chapter is to determine that a regulated environment of 
corporate governance reduces managerial opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, the evidence 
shows the „comply or explain‟ nature of soft regulation is effective in New Zealand and that it 
reduces managerial discretionary accruals. The findings of this chapter are beneficial for not 
only New Zealand corporate governance legislators but for other countries in developing or 
restoring corporate governance guidelines. 
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Chapter 4 
The Effect of Corporate Governance Regulations on Firm 
Value: New Zealand Evidence
7
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter contributes to the corporate governance and firm value literature by documenting 
the associations between corporate governance regulation, managerial discretion and firm 
valuation in New Zealand. Firm value can be defined as an economic measure that reflects the 
market value of the whole business. It is the aggregate of claims of the debt holders, 
preference stockholders, and common stockholders. Firm value is also a performance measure 
that compares book and market value. Understanding the effect of corporate governance 
regulations on firm value is important because it effects, inter alia, the opportunistic 
behaviour of management as well as the decision-making process used by investors. Further, 
it is posited that investors would prefer a regulated environment because it offers some level 
of protection to their investments (Clark, 2004; LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 2000). Prior literature suggests that corporate governance does have a positive impact 
on firm value as measured by Tobin‟s Q (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003), and the price-to-
book ratio (Garay & Gonzalez, 2008). 
A consequence of the corporate collapses that occurred in the late 20
th
 and the early 21
st
 
centuries is that legal forms of corporate governance, and regulations that can be characterised 
as a „comply or explain‟ type of regulation  are commonly found in many countries, The short 
term and long term effects of these corporate governance „codes‟ is not clear, and this chapter 
provides evidence that these types of corporate governance regulations will reduce 
discretionary actions by management in the short term and will maximise firm value in the 
long term. 
Using a sample of seventy companies that were listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZX) over the period 2000 to 2007, this study finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis 
that firms have a high level of compliance with corporate governance regulations have higher 
value to investors, i.e. a higher firm value.  
                                                 
7
 This Chapter forms the basis of a paper that was co-authored with Dr. Jamal Roudaki and Murray Clark, and 
was presented at a conference on „22nd Asian Pacific Conference on International Issues‟; Bond University, Gold 
Coast, Australia, November 7-9, 2010. 
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Corporate governance is measured based on the „Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 
2003‟, the „Principles and Guidelines of Corporate Governance 2004‟ and the „Companies 
Act 1993‟ indicates better monitoring and internal control systems ("Corporate Governance 
Best Practice Code," 2003; Corporate Governance in New Zealand Principles and 
Guidelines," 2004). One stream of research on corporate governance suggests that governance 
mechanisms reduce managerial discretionary accruals. Another stream of research documents 
that implementing corporate governance guidelines/rules leads to an increase in firm 
performance. This chapter employs three different measures of firm value, (Tobin‟s Q, Price-
to-Book ratio and Enterprise Value), and four different discretionary accruals models (Jones 
model, Modified Jones model, Performance Matched model, and Performance Matched Free 
Cash Flow model) to establish the effect on firm value.  
4.2 Literature Review 
The classic argument of agency theory is that the separation of owners and managers leads to 
information asymmetry between the parties. To control opportunistic behaviour by managers, 
several external control mechanisms are available, such as externally imposed regulations and 
the appointment of independent directors. Regulatory agencies impose regulations to mitigate 
the agency problem, but voluntary mechanisms as typified by the „comply or explain‟ nature 
of corporate governance practices may not be as effective as mandatory regulations. 
Following this argument, the literature reveals evidence that weak or voluntary regulations 
may not be sufficiently strong to protect the investment made by, and achieve the objectives 
of, investors (Farrar, 2005). However, investor protection is reduced in the absence of any 
form of regulatory control irrespective to the nature of regulations. 
Fasterling (2005) argues that investor confidence will also increase when the stock market is 
regulated, even when compliance with those regulations is voluntary as compared to 
mandatory. The „comply or explain‟ nature of voluntary regulation creates an implicit 
competition among companies to attract investors in their stock. Companies can convey a 
positive signal to the public if investors are aware that they have adopted a recognised code of 
practice regarding corporate governance (Fasterling, 2005). Therefore, better compliance with 
a code of corporate governance leads to better terms for the investor confidence (Doidge, 
Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007) which in turn, leads to an environment where investors are willing to 
pay more than market price for stock in order to achieve a lower risk on investment. However, 
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the literature of corporate governance and firm valuation in respect of voluntary regulation is 
inconclusive (Anderson & Gupta, 2009). 
The regulatory system of an economy has a strong influence on the corporate governance 
system. A regulated environment ensures relatively more protection for investors (LaPorta et 
al., 2000), and firms that operate in better legal regimes rely more on external financing to 
fund their growth (LaPorta, Florencio, Andrei, & Robert, 1997). Investor protection 
encourages the development of financial markets since  protected investors pay more for 
securities thereby increasing the attractiveness of securities as an investment (LaPorta et al., 
2000). LaPorta et al. (1997) show that countries with protected shareholders have more 
valuable stock market. Both “insider” shareholders, i.e. minority shareholders and controlling 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000), have significant power with respect to the control 
mechanisms within the firm. However, the effect of voluntary regulation, especially a 
„comply or explain‟ corporate governance code, arguably leads to better monitoring of 
management. It is well established that state laws of corporate governance affect firm value 
(Gompers et al., 2003). 
Black, Jang and Kim (2006) prepared a corporate governance index using 515 Korean 
companies based on a 2001 Korean Stock Exchange survey. They categorised their corporate 
governance index using five different dimensions and  by using ordinary least squares 
regression analysis, found 47% prediction of corporate governance indices with Tobin‟s Q as 
a proxy of firm value and about 160% increase in share price. Gompers et al. (2003) 
constructed a „Governance Index‟ using 24 corporate governance rules as a proxy of 
shareholders rights for a sample of 1500 large firms. They found that firms in the highest 
decile of the index with the highest level of managerial power meant weak shareholder rights 
– these were categorised as being in the „Dictatorship Portfolio‟. Similarly, the strongest 
shareholder rights were observed to be in firms at the lower deciles of their index – these were 
categorised as being in the „Democracy Portfolio‟.  
Firm performance or firm value (Black et al., 2006; L. Brown & Caylor, 2006; L. D. Brown 
& Caylor, 2004; Gompers et al., 2003) is one of the major research stream in regulation of 
corporate governance and consequences. Black et al. (2006) focused on few dimension of 
those consequences. First, high value firms tend to adopt good governance practices as 
compared to low value firms. Second, firms may endogenously choose different governance 
practices. Third, firms may adopt good governance rules to signal that the firm‟s insiders will 
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behave, but it is the signal, not the governance practices, that affects share prices. Finally, 
they concerned with omitted variable bias as economic variable may ignore and come in 
wrong conclusion of corporate governance effects on firm‟s value. 
Firms operating for long signalling business stability and moderate governance practice. 
Development process of firm improved during the process of operation and firm understood 
their own strength and weakness (Jovanovic, 1982). However, matured firms have more 
spread of operation and complexity which increase agency costs. Younger firms have fast 
growing potentiality rather than older firms (Black et al., 2006). The listing status of firm, 
which indicates managerial confidence about the future prospects for the firm, also indicates 
better monitoring on behalf of shareholders, which is reflected in the stock price. (Sanger & 
McConnell, 1986). However, a relatively new firm may not have the same impact on 
investors. Black et al., (2006) evidenced a negative coefficient because younger firms are 
likely to be fast growing and be intangible asset-intensive.  
Regulation and investor protection have been shown to have a positive relationship by many 
research studies (Black et al., 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; LaPorta et al., 1997; LaPorta et al., 
2000). Strong regulations concerning corporate governance tend to result in greater 
compliance practices by firms. A „one size fit all‟ approach to regulation may not suit all the 
firms in the economy and as the variation increases the legal environment gets less investor 
friendly (Durnev & Kim, 2005). Consistent with previous research, Durven and Kim (2005) 
found a positive statistical relationship with governance and disclosure practices related to 
growth opportunities. For growth, firms need more external financing and concentration on 
cash flow. Such positive relations are stronger in countries with weak legal frameworks. 
Moreover, they argue that good investment opportunities provide more incentives to improve 
governance practices among firms in countries with a weak legal environment, and finally, 
the quality of governance and disclosure practices are positively related to firm valuation and 
this relationship is weaker in a strong legal environment. 
4.3 Hypothesis Development 
The question “does good corporate governance practice affect the value of a firm” reflects the 
consequence of effective corporate governance. In two earlier chapters, corporate governance 
practice was posited as not only the contribution of having regulations. In order to exist, 
companies must have a minimum level of governance in place, but having regulations 
provides a safer environment for investors. Following major corporate collapses in late the 
 71 
 
20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries, many countries have introduced or enhanced existing regulations 
and/or guidelines concerning corporate governance. These will not prevent corporate 
collapses from occurring in the future, but they should provide a more secure capital market 
as a result of better systems of corporate governance. Prior studies provide evidence that an 
effective system of corporate governance is positively related to investor protection (Durnev 
& Kim, 2005; LaPorta et al., 2000). 
A significant number of empirical studies have focused on  understanding the relationship 
between corporate governance and ownership concentration (Davies, Hiller, & McColgan, 
2005), board of director independence (Orr, Emanuel, & Wong, 2005), the effectiveness of 
various board committees, and managerial compensation. The results of these studies have not 
been  conclusive because of differences between countries due to different economic 
conditions and differing legal environments (Maher & Anderson, 1999). Recent studies have 
also focussed on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Black 
et al., 2006; Gompers et al., 2003). 
Agency theory posits that managers are motivated to perform better in order to enhance their 
own position, usually by way of compensation or bonus plans that are based on reported 
accounting numbers. It is therefore logical to argue that managers may use discretionary 
accounting policies to manage their earnings in order to meet targeted net income (or some 
other targets) that acts as a threshold to gaining enhanced remuneration. In a competitive and 
well-structured capital market, investors are well aware that this may be happening, and 
therefore will factor this into stock market prices (Cornell & Landsman, 2003). It can 
therefore be concluded that stock market prices will be affected when investors are provided 
with information about discretionary policies used by management. 
Previous literature documents that strong and effective systems of internal control will 
enhance firm value. Chhachharia and Grinstein (2007) demonstrate that corporate governance 
does have an economic impact on the firm, and conclude, interestingly, that firms that are less 
compliant with the rules have greater firm value as compared to more compliant firms. 
Moreover, they found that board independence and internal control have no effect on small 
firms but they do for large firms because they experience greater benefits if they comply with 
the rules. To mitigate the agency problem previously discussed, firms can introduce more 
effective monitoring of management by having outside directors on the board (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Independent boards have more monitoring power as compared to boards that 
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are dominated by „insiders‟. Outside directors are also likely to enrich the board because they 
may come from diverse backgrounds and bring different experiences to the boardroom.  Orr 
et al. (2005) shows that the proportion of outsider directors for high growth  firms is 
positively related to firm value. They included tenure of director, directors‟ equity ownership, 
outside involvement of directors and proportion of non-executive directors as attributes in 
their study. 
The above discussion suggests that firms with a high proportion of independent directors, 
appropriate monitoring committees and efficient external auditors will have an effective 
system of monitoring managerial activity. A high level of monitoring reduces opportunistic 
behaviour of managers and provides greater confidence to investors, which, in turn, has a 
positive effect on the value of the firm. Hence, the null hypothesis tested is as follows: 
01H : There is no relationship between compliance with corporate governance regulations 
and firm value. 
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4.4 Research Methodology 
The sample of this study is the same as that used in the previous sections. 
4.4.1 Measuring Dependent Variables 
To investigate the effect of corporate governance regulation compliance on firm value, the 
following equation (equation 3) is used. Ordinary least squares regression is used for analysis 
based on balanced panel data which pools the observation cross sectional and overall effect. 
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Where, 
FV= Firm Value (measured in Tobin’s Q, Price to Book ration and Enterprise Value) 
REGDUMM = Regulation dummy of 1 for corporate governance regulation otherwise 0; 
CGI = Corporate Governance Index (comprehensive corporate governance indicator with 20 
different items categorized under Board Composition, Board Committee, Auditing and 
Managerial Ownership & Dual Listing; 
DAC = Discretionary Accruals of Net Income Measured with Jones Model (1991), Modified 
Jones Model (1995), Performance Matched Model (2005) and Performance matched Free 
Cash Flow model; 
REGDUMM*CGI*DAC = Interacting variable of regulation dummy, corporate governance 
and discretionary accruals; 
CNTLSHR = Control Shareholding (Single shareholders holding more than 50% share are 
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise; 
NZXLISTTEN = New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Tenure; 
OPERTEN = Operating tenure of firm; 
SIZE = Total Assets as a proxy of business size; 
LEVERAGE = Company leverage; 
ROA = Return on Assets; 
SECTDUMM = Sector Dummy; 
.  = Error term. 
Firm value can be defined as the economic value of firm which the market forces are ready to 
pay. Previous literature suggests different measures of firm value, with Tobin‟s Q and the 
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Price-to-Book ratio being the most common. Theoretically, enterprise value (EV) is also a 
strong measure of firm value, and this has been considered in this study as well. The 
following sections discuss these three measures. 
4.4.1.1 Tobin’s Q: 
The first definition of Firm Value (FV) in this research is as indicated by Tobin‟s Q formula. 
Chung and Pruitt (1994) argue that this formula provides a strong  prediction of the  
replacement value of the firm. Tobin‟s Q is based on the hypothesis that the combined market 
value of all the companies on the stock market should be equivalent to their replacement 
costs. It compares total outstanding equity and debt in market value to the total assets at book 
value. Tobin‟s ratio less than 1 indicates that stock is undervalued, and in this situation firms 
have little incentive to invest because the value of new capital investment falls below its costs. 
Conversely, a Tobin Q ratio more than 1 indicates that stock is overvalued and firms would 
have a strong incentive to invest because the value of new capital investment would exceed 
costs. Noteworthy research was conducted based on Tobin‟s Q to predict firm value and 
found a significant relationship between corporate governance regulation and firm value 
(Black et al., 2006; Garay & Gonzalez, 2008). Tobin‟s Q is calculated as follows: 
'  
CS PS TD
Tobin s Q
TA
 
  
Where, CS = Common Stock at market value; 
PS = Preferred stock at market value; 
TD = Total Debt; 
TA = Total Assets at book value. 
4.4.1.2 Price-to-Book ratio (P-B ratio): 
The second definition of Firm Value (FV) which is considered relevant to the objectives of 
this study is the price-to-book ratio (P-B ratio) which compares book value of the firm to the 
market value. A higher P-B ratio indicates that investors expect management to create more 
value from a given set of business assets. However, a low P-B ratio may also indicate a good 
investment opportunity. The P-B ratio may become meaningless for high tech companies 
because most of the assets are hidden (intangible) in these types of firms. Some prior research 
has used the P-B ratio as a measure of firm value (Garay & Gonzalez, 2008; Leal & 
Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005). The formula for this ratio is: 
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CS PS
Price Book ratio
Equity

   
Where, 
CS = Common Stock at market value; 
PS = Preferred stock at market value; 
 
4.4.1.3 Enterprise Value: 
The third definition of firm value used in this study is Enterprise Value (EV). Theoretically, 
enterprise value is more representative than other measures of firm value because it provides a 
much more accurate estimate of the value of the firm since it is based on a takeover value. 
Enterprise Value is calculated as follows: 
Enterprise Value = (Market Value of Equity + Market Value of Debt – Cash Holding) 
Enterprise values are collected from DataStream (item no # 307). This study investigates the 
effect that corporate governance regulation has on enterprise value. 
Considering the three different variables that measure firm value, the following models are 
used to satisfy the objectives of this research. 
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Where, 
REGDUMM  = Regulation dummy of 1 for corporate governance regulation otherwise 0; 
CGI    = Corporate Governance Index (comprehensive corporate governance 
indicator with 20 different items categorized under Board Composition, Board Committee, 
Auditing and Managerial Ownership & Dual Listing; 
DAC    = Discretionary Accruals of Net Income Measured with Jones Model 
(1991), Modified Jones Model (1995), Performance Matched Model (2005) and Performance 
based Free Cash Flow model; 
CNTLSHR   = Control Shareholding (Single shareholders holding more than 50% share 
are coded as 1 and 0 otherwise; 
NZXLISTTEN  = New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Tenure; 
OPERTEN   = Operating tenure of firm; 
SIZE    = Total Assets as a proxy of business size; 
LEVERAGE  = Company leverage; 
ROA    = Return on Assets; 
SECTDUMM  = Sector Dummy; 
.     = Error term. 
4.4.2 Measuring Independent Variables 
To measure the effect of firm value the following independent variables were also considered. 
4.4.2.1 Corporate Governance Index 
 A Corporate Governance Index (CGI) was prepared for each company using the approach 
specified in chapter 2 
4.4.2.2 Discretionary Accruals 
The amount of total accruals is the difference between net income and the cash flow from 
operating activities. Total accruals can be divided into discretionary accruals and non-
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals arise due to management decisions, and this is 
used as the independent variable in our model. Discretionary accruals were measured based 
on the Jones Model (Jones, 1991), the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995), the 
Performance Matched Model (Kothari et al., 2005), and the Performance Matched Free Cash 
Flow Model (PBFCF model). The total accruals for the PBFCF model is the difference 
between net incomes and free cash flow where free cash flow is the sum of cash flow from 
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operating activities and cash flow from investing activities (Dechow & Ge, 2006). 
Discretionary accruals were calculated based on following equations: 
Jones Model: 
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Where, 
TA = Total Accruals;  
A = Total Assets; 
REV = Change of Revenues; 
PPE = Property Plant and Equipment; 
NDA = Non discretionary accruals; 
REC (or AR) = Change of accounts receivables; 
ROA = Return on Assets; 
 t= time; 
α = coefficients; 
β = coefficients. 
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4.4.2.3 Control Shareholding 
If one entity or an individual holds at least half of the issued shares, they are considered to 
have the control shareholding of the company. Clearly if the controlling shareholder owns less 
than 100% of the share, there must be a minority shareholding. The control shareholder has a 
dominant position on the board and can control board activities, board decisions, and access 
to information. It is expected that there would be a negative relationship between control 
shareholding and firm value. 
4.4.2.4 Firm Operating Tenure  
The fact that a firm has been operating for a long period of time suggests that the business has 
experienced stability (in relative terms) and growth. New firms tend to be in a „high growth‟ 
phase whereas older firms tend to have a more stable market capitalization. However, old 
firms also tend to have relatively old management which introduces delays in the decision 
making processes (Faleye, 2007). It is expected that there will be a negative relationship 
between firm operating tenure and firm value. 
4.4.2.5  NZX Listing Tenure 
NZX listing tenure is the number of years that the firm has been listed on the New Zealand 
Stock Exchange. It is expected that there is a positive relationship between long term listing 
status and investor confidence. 
4.4.3 Control Variable 
Following previous studies, e.g. (Black et al., 2006; Gompers et al., 2003) total assets is used 
as a proxy of firm size. It is expected that a large firm will generate more opportunities to 
increase the value of that firm because there are more investment opportunities and easier for 
a large firm as compared to a small firm. Also, a firm with higher leverage will have more 
monitoring by external parties, which should lead to an increase in firm value. Leverage has 
also been considered by previous research (Black et al., 2006). 
4.5 Empirical Results 
As previously stated, the objective of this study is to measure the effectiveness of corporate 
governance regulations in New Zealand. Empirical results are presented in descriptive, 
correlation and regression formats in the following sections. 
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4.5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of dependent and all the independent variables 
except dichotomous variables and sector dummies. The descriptive analysis was conducted on 
the data before transformation. 
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Tobin's Q 0.07 30.88 1.83 2.49 7.18 70.25 
Price  to Book Value -1550.98 97.49 -2.32 72.12 -18.65 387.03 
Enterprise Value -1939.00 96312500.00 2935398.41 12524589.28 5.69 31.99 
Corporate Governance Index 0.25 0.90 0.54 0.12 0.31 -0.51 
Jones Discretionary Accruals 0.00 2.88 0.10 0.19 8.12 98.14 
Modified Jones Discretionary 
Accruals 
0.00 2.92 0.10 0.20 8.31 98.93 
Performance Matched 
Discretionary Accruals 
0.00 1.76 0.09 0.14 6.54 63.13 
Performance Matched Free Cash 
Flow Discretionary Accruals 
0.01 12.24 0.93 1.46 3.54 16.45 
Interaction of Jones 
discretionary accruals, corporate 
governance index and regulation 
dummy 
0.00 0.55 0.02 0.05 4.60 31.15 
Interaction of Modified Jones 
discretionary accruals, corporate 
governance index and regulation 
dummy 
0.00 0.55 0.02 0.05 4.67 32.07 
Interaction of Performance 
matched discretionary accruals, 
corporate governance index and 
regulation dummy 
0.00 0.62 0.02 0.05 5.78 57.48 
Interaction of Performance 
matched free cash flow 
discretionary accruals, corporate 
governance index and regulation 
dummy 
0.00 7.49 0.26 0.64 5.27 40.50 
NZX Listing Tenure 1.00 49.00 14.32 11.92 1.34 0.84 
Firm Operating Tenure 1.00 148.00 30.30 34.35 2.14 3.84 
Total Assets 1541.00 37874000.00 1732828.69 6024749.78 5.23 26.99 
Leverage 0.00 4.57 0.29 0.33 7.31 80.06 
Return On Assets -4.91 3.91 0.07 0.38 -1.58 83.73 
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Table 15 shows that minimum 25% of corporate governance code compliance for the entire 
firm and maximum 90% of the factor complied. All the discretionary accrual measurement 
(Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, Performance Based Model and Performance Based 
Free Cash Flow Model) have lower discretionary accruals i.e. close to zero. An analysis of 
skewness and kurtosis shows that all the variables are not normally distributed. A method 
proposed by Cooke (1998) is used to normalize the variables, which is based on the approach 
used by Van der Waerden (1952, 1953) . The transformation proposed is achieved by dividing 
the normal distribution into a number of observations plus one segment on the basis that each 
segment has equal probability. The same transformation was performed for all the variables. 
Table 16, shows the descriptive analysis of transformed data. The skewness and kurtosis 
results in Table 15 indicated that the variables were not normally distributed, but Table 16 
shows that the transformed data is normally distributed which enables more predictable power 
of findings. 
4.5.2 Correlation Analysis 
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Table 16: Transformed Descriptive analysis 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Price to Book ratio -2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
Tobin‟s_Q -2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
Enterprise Value -2.91 2.79 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.14 
Corporate Governance Index -2.91 2.79 0.00 0.97 0.03 -0.18 
Jones Discretionary Accruals -2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
Modified Jones Discretionary 
Accruals 
-2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
Performance Matched 
Discretionary Accruals 
-2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
Free cash flow discretionary 
accruals 
-2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
Interaction of Jones 
discretionary accruals, 
corporate governance index 
and regulation dummy 
-0.67 2.91 0.06 0.85 0.80 -0.35 
Interaction of Modified Jones 
discretionary accruals, 
corporate governance index 
and regulation dummy 
-0.67 2.91 0.06 0.85 0.80 -0.35 
Interaction of Performance 
matched discretionary accruals, 
corporate governance index 
and regulation dummy 
-0.67 2.91 0.06 0.85 0.80 -0.35 
Interaction of Performance 
matched free cash flow 
discretionary accruals, 
corporate governance index 
and regulation dummy 
-0.67 2.91 0.06 0.85 0.80 -0.35 
NZX Listing Tenure -2.14 2.79 0.00 0.98 0.05 -0.25 
Firm Operating Tenure -2.55 2.79 0.00 0.99 0.01 -0.17 
Total Assets -2.91 2.79 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.14 
Leverage -1.93 2.91 0.00 0.98 0.08 -0.31 
Return on Assets -2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
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Table 17: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Tobin's Q (1) 1 0.40*** 0.16*** 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.31*** -0.23*** 0.20*** -0.10** 0.04 -0.28*** 0.10** 0.33*** -0.04 -0.01 
Price to Book ratio (2)   1 0.07 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.09** 0.09** 0.06 -0.01 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.09** -0.03 0.10*** 0.09** -0.07** -0.07* 0.05 -0.03 -0.12*** 0.01** 0.10** 0.04 0.02 
Enterprise Value (3)     1 0.10** 0.48*** 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.08** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.12** -0.10 0.00 0.06 0.90*** 0.33*** -0.05 0.18*** 0.01 0.07* -0.25*** -0.03 -0.06 
Regulation Dummy (4)       1 0.14*** -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.03 0.29*** 0.17*** 0.08* 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CGI (5)         1 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.02 0.18*** 0.31*** 0.46*** 0.11** -0.17*** 0.28*** 0.12*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.09** -0.18*** 
Discretionary Accruals - Jones Model 
(6) 
          1 0.97*** 0.58*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.18*** 0.08 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.10** 0.05 -0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Discretionary Accruals - Modified 
Jones Model (7) 
            1 0.59*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.18*** 0.08** -0.01 -0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.09** 0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 
Discretionary Accruals - Performance 
Matched Model (8) 
              1 0.27*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.27*** 0.08* -0.01 -0.13*** 0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.14*** 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 
Discretionary Accruals - Performance 
Matched Free Cash Flow Model (9) 
                1 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.35*** 0.04 -0.04 0.08* 0.11** 0.02 -0.15*** 0.14*** -0.08* 0.00 -0.02 -0.10** -0.05 
Corporate Governance Index * DAC – 
Jones Model * Regulation Dummy  
(10) 
                  1 1.00*** 0.94*** 0.85*** 0.01 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.12*** 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 
Corporate Governance Index * DA – 
Modified Jones * Regulation Dummy 
(11) 
                    1 0.94*** 0.85*** 0.01 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 
Corporate Governance Index * DAC – 
Performance Matched Model * 
Regulation Dummy (12) 
                      1 0.85*** 0.03 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 
Corporate Governance Index * 
Performance Matched Free Cash Flow 
Model * Regulation Dummy (13) 
                        1 0.05 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.11 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 
Control Shareholding (14)                           1 -0.09** 0.02 -0.08** -0.20*** -0.01 0.16*** -0.10** 0.18*** -0.09** -0.11** -0.17*** 
NZX Listing Tenure 15)                             1 0.41** 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.09** 0.00 
Operating Tenure  (16)                               1 0.17*** -0.18*** -0.06 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.00 -0.24*** -0.05 -0.11** 
Total Assets  (17)                                 1 0.21*** -0.01 0.19*** 0.10** 0.10** -0.40*** -0.03 -0.03 
Leverage (18)                                   1 -0.01 0.09** -0.02 0.02 -0.08** -0.03 -0.03 
ROA (19)                                     1 -0.18*** 0.13*** 0.19*** -0.12** 0.09** 0.03 
Service Sector Dummy (20)                                       1 -0.35*** -0.33*** -0.40*** -0.25*** -0.25*** 
Primary Sector Dummy (21)                                         1 -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.11** -0.11** 
Energy Sector Dummy (22)                                           1 -0.16*** -0.10** -0.10** 
Goods Sector Dummy (23)                                             1 -0.12*** -0.12*** 
Property Sector Dummy (24)                                               1 -0.08** 
Investment Sector Dummy (25)                                                 1 
*** Correlation Significant at 1% level; 
**   Correlation significant at 5% level (two tail); 
*     Correlation significant at 10% level. 
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Table 17, shows the correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables. 
Regulated environment results positive correlation with firm value measure of price to book 
ration (r=0.13) at 1% level of significance and enterprise value (r=0.10) at 5% level of 
significance indicates regulated environment enhance higher firm value. 
Moreover, it shows that corporate governance index and firm value measurements have a 
statistically positive relationship, indicating that greater compliance with corporate 
governance codes increases the value of the firm. Corporate governance index results positive 
correlation with price to book ratio (r=0.13) and enterprise value (r=0.48) at 1% level of 
significance but Tobin‟s Q. Similarly, performance matched free cash flow model 
documented statistically significant correlation (r=0.08) at 5% level of significance. 
Discretionary accruals value was taken as an absolute value for measuring firm value 
(Davidson, Goodwin, & Kent, 2005; Sanchez-Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2007), irrespective of 
the actual amount of the accrual, and it shows that there is a positive relationship between 
discretionary accruals and firm value. 
Control shareholding and firm value shows a consistently negative relationship with more 
than 10% level of statistical significance, implying that companies with controlling 
shareholders have lower firm value. The interaction variable among corporate governance 
index, discretionary accruals (Jones, Modified Jones, Performance Matched and Performance 
Matched Free Cash Flow Model) and regulation dummy (CGI * DAC * REGDUMMY) 
indicates stronger correlation of firm value with price to book ratio (r=0.09) at 1% level of 
significance and enterprise value (r=0.12) at 5% level of significance but Tobin‟s Q. 
The correlation matrix among the sectors is strong correlated with firm value measuring 
methods as Tobin‟s Q results primary sector (r=-0.28) at 1% level of significance, energy 
sector (r=0.10) at 5% level of significance and goods sector (r=0.33) at 1% level of 
significance. Price to book ratio results strong correlation with primary sector (r=-0.12) at 1% 
level of significance, energy sector (r=0.01) at 5% level of significance and goods sector 
(r=0.10) at 5% level of significance. Finally, enterprise value shows, strong correlation with 
service sector (r=0.18) at 1% level of significance, energy sector (r=0.07) at 10% level of 
significance and goods sector (r=-0.25) at 1% level of significance. Property and investment 
sector does not show any statistical significance with firm value. 
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4.5.3 Regression Analysis 
The results of equations 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c) using the measure of all the discretionary accruals 
are presented in Table 18. All the three definitions of firm value are explained in the 
discretionary accruals models tested, namely the Jones Model, the Modified Jones Model, the 
Performance Matched Model and the Free Cash Flow Discretionary Accruals model of 
discretionary accruals. 
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Table 18: Regression Analysis Results 
 
* Correlation significant at 5% level; ** Correlation Significant at 1% level; † Correlation significant at 10% level 
 
Variables 
Specification 1: Tobin’s Q Specification 2: Price to Book Ratio Specification 3: Enterprise Value 
Jones 
Model 
Modified 
Jones 
Model 
Performance 
Matched 
Model 
Performance 
Matched Free 
Cash Flow 
Model 
Jones 
Model 
Modified 
Jones 
Model 
Performance 
Matched 
Model 
Performance 
Matched Free 
Cash Flow 
Model 
Jones 
Model 
Modified 
Jones 
Model 
Performance 
Matched 
Model 
Performance 
Matched Free 
Cash Flow 
Model 
Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -0.09 -0.08 -0.1 -0.1 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.21† 0.1 0.11 -0.09 -0.04 
Regulation 
Dummy 
0.28 0.27 0.316† 0.34† 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.425* 0.04 0.01 -0.13 1.94† 
Corporate 
Governance 
Index 
0.21** 0.21** 0.21** 0.20** 0.24** 0.24** 0.24** 0.248* 0.48** 0.48** 0.48** 0.49** 
Discretionary 
Accrual – Jones 
Model(ABS) 
0.06       0.10†       -0.03       
Discretionary 
Accruals – 
Modified Jones 
Model (ABS) 
  0.06       0.11*       -0.04     
Discretionary 
Accruals – 
Performance 
Matched Model 
(ABS) 
    0.03       0.08       -0.04   
Discretionary 
Accruals – 
Performance 
Matched FCF 
(ABS) 
      -0.3       0.05       1.37 
Interaction of 
Corporate 
Governance, 
Regulation and 
Jones Model 
Discretionary 
Accrual 
-0.07       -0.06       0.07       
Corporate 
Governance, 
Regulation and 
Modified Jones 
Model 
Discretionary 
Accrual 
  -0.07       -0.07       0.1     
Corporate 
Governance, 
Regulation and 
Performance 
Matched Model 
Discretionary 
Accrual 
    -0.1       -0.06       0.01   
Corporate 
Governance, 
Regulation and 
Performance 
Matched FCF 
Model 
Discretionary 
Accrual 
      -0.12       -0.17       -1.25** 
Control 
Shareholding 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.26** -0.26** -0.27** -0.14** 
NZX Listing 
Tenure 
-0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.10** -0.10** -0.11* -0.1* 
Business 
Operating 
Tenure 
-0.22** -0.21** -0.22** -0.21** 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.52 
Firm Size -0.23** -0.23** -0.23** -0.23** -0.14* -0.14* -0.14** -0.15** x  x  x  x  
Leverage 0.19** 0.19** 0.2** 0.19** -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 .0.23** 0.23** 0.23** 0.23** 
Return on 
Assets 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.2 -0.03 0.10* 0.10* 0.1 0.09* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Primary Sector -0.64** -0.64** -0.65** -0.67** -0.38* -0.36* -0.40* -0.4** -0.20** -0.20† -0.20† -0.17 
Energy Sector -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 0.22 0.23 0.216 0.24† 0.42 0.41** 0.43** 0.43** 
Goods Sector 0.48** 0.48** 0.48** 0.47** 0.28* 0.29* 0.278 0.28* -0.46 -0.47** -0.47** -0.46** 
Property Sector -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 0.23 0.23 0.212 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.22 
Investment 
Sector 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.23 0.23 0.219 0.21 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.21 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Coeff. 
0.54 0.054 0.54 0.55 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.611 
Adjusted R
2
 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.354 0.356 0.36 0.36 
F-Statistics 15.18** 15.19** 15.11** 15.39** 4.41** 4.48** 4.27** 4.22** 22.85** 22.91** 22.97** 23.2 
Durbin-Watson 
Stat. 
2.02 2.02 2.02 2 2.04 2.04 2.03 2.02 1.86 1.85 1.85 1.85 
Observation 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
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Table 18 presents the primary multivariate regression analysis to examine the association 
between compliance with corporate governance codes and firm value after controlling for a 
number of possible determinants of such specialization. Three specification and four different 
models under each specification are presented. Enterprise value and performance matched 
free cash flow are the primary variable of interest in this chapter. 
The first specification of firm value is based on Tobin‟s Q. Columns 2 to 9 in Table 18 
present the results based on Tobin‟s Q. These results reveal that firm value is more for the 
companies that have a higher compliance with corporate governance index. Specifically, 
Firms that following precisely corporate governance regulation is generating more firm value. 
The result is statistically significant at 1% level. The regulatory impact of corporate 
governance affects firm value as measured by Tobin‟s Q, the performance matched model of 
discretionary accruals (statistically significant at the 10% level) and the performance matched 
free cash flow model (statistically significant at the 5% level). However, it should be noted 
that the performance matched free cash flow model of discretionary accruals has a negative 
effect on Tobin‟s Q. The interacting coefficient corporate governance index, regulation 
dummy and discretionary accruals (CGI*REGDUMMY*DAC
8
) (DAC means in general 
Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched 
Free Cash Flow Model)  has a negative effect as expected but it is not statistically significant 
on Tobin‟s Q specification of firm value. Our results show that although Tobin‟s Q increased 
it is not statistically significant with discretionary accruals and regulation, but corporate 
governance and regulation effects are statistically significant. 
The second specification of firm value, price to book ratio, indicates (column 10 to 17) that 
regulations have a positive effect in the performance matched free cash flow model with 5% 
level of significance. The interaction among discretionary accruals model, corporate 
governance index and dummy variable (CGI * REGDUMMY * DAC) also have negative 
coefficients with price to book value ratio but with statistical significance higher than the 10% 
level. The coefficient for interacting variable is -0.06, -0.07, -0.06 and -0.17 for Jones, 
Modified Jones, Performance Matched and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow 
discretionary accruals respectively. However, the corporate governance compliance has a 
                                                 
8
 Interacting variable of Corporate Governance index (CGI), Dummy variable of Regulation (REGDUMMY) 
and Discretionary accruals (DAC) measured by Jones (1991), Modified Jones (1995), Performance Matched 
Model (Kothari et al., 2005) and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model based on Free Cash Flow as 
determinant of Total Accruals. 
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positive coefficient as 0.24 for each of the discretionary accrual model at the 1% level of 
significance. This implies that firms that comply with corporate governance criteria and have 
better internal control systems have a market value higher than the book value of firm. This 
specification also supports the proposition that firm value has a positive relationship with 
corporate governance compliance. 
The third specification of firm value, enterprise value (column 18 to 25), shows a stronger 
effect of the variables as compared to the Tobin‟s Q and price to book ratio models. 
Regulation has a positive and significant effect on firm (enterprise) value for the performance 
matched free cash flow discretionary accruals model. The corporate governance index 
coefficient shows statistically significance at the 1% level. This implies that corporate 
governance compliance leads to greater confidence by stakeholders, which leads to an 
increase in the value of firm. Theoretically, enterprise value represents a more accurate value 
as it considers current market value and total debt of firm. Discretionary accruals (Jones, 
Modified Jones and Performance Matched models) have negative effects on enterprise value. 
This implies managerial discretionary accrual does affect firm value. More specifically, firm 
value will decrease if discretionary accruals increase. The Performance Matched Free-Cash-
Flow model shows that reducing the discretion of net income leads to an increase in market 
value (coefficient = -1.25, t-statistics -3.16), and is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Enterprise value was found to be much lower for controlling shareholder under performance 
matched free cash flow model with a 1% level of significance. This implies firm with control 
shareholding have less effect of corporate governance which ultimately reduces enterprise 
value. The coefficient of New Zealand Stock Exchange listing tenure (NZXLISTEN) is 
negative and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies firm listed for long time 
in NZX has lower enterprise value than relatively recent listed status. This result is consistent 
with the argument that uncertainty contributes to firm value for a young firm (Pastor & 
Veronesi, 2003). Moreover, it implies that older firms who have established bureaucratic 
processes over business activities tend to lack flexibility that enables them to rapidly adjust to 
changing conditions, which can lead to a reduction in market performance as compared to 
younger firms (Marshall, 1920). 
Briefly, corporate governance index shows the most consistent positive coefficient with 
statistical significance for all the specification and discretionary accrual model. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, to focus on primary variable of interest as interaction of corporate 
governance index, performance matched free cash flow and regulation dummy shows 
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statistically significant coefficient -1.25 at 1% level of significance for enterprise value 
specification and the null hypothesis rejected. 
All the definitions with discretionary accruals have separate measure of
 regression. Tobin‟s Q 
is consistently showed R
2
 =28% where as price to book ratio is consistently shows R
2 
=8% 
but Modified Jones model discretionary accruals shows R
2
=9%. Finally, enterprise value 
measure of firm value shows the highest R
2
=36% and consistent value across the models. To 
assess the statistical significance of all the firm value definitions have an F-stat which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. 
4.6 Conclusions and remarks 
Corporate governance research is one of the most researched areas in accounting. However, 
very few observable inputs are available to evaluate enterprise value as a proxy of firm value 
based on corporate governance compliance. A sizable body of empirical research has found 
that firm value is determined by corporate governance compliance and certain firm specific 
characteristics. This chapter expands this stream of research by incorporating enterprise value 
as a measure of firm value and discretionary accruals calculation using different models as an 
important explanatory variable. Companies are complying corporate governance practice over 
the time for regulatory or voluntary purpose because this compliance enhances better internal 
monitoring system reduces discretionary accruals. 
Although discretionary accrual has been researched from informational asymmetry and 
opportunistic behaviour aspects, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to 
document an association between discretionary accruals as a proxy of opportunistic behaviour 
and firm valuation. This study finds evidence consistent with the proposition that corporate 
governance compliance reduces management opportunistic behaviour and results in increased 
firm value because of significant improvements in internal control mechanism due to 
compliance (Larcker, Richardson, & Irem, 2005). This research can be further extended on 
management incentive with performance matched free cash flow model. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter five is developed as follows: 5.1 presents a holistic discussion and summarizes the 
findings regarding the three objectives; in section 5.2, the regulatory implication is discussed; 
contributions are discussed in section 5.3 and finally, limitations and future research 
directions are discussed in section 5.4. 
5. 2 Discussion of findings 
The dominant paradigm of corporate governance research assumes voluntary regulation is not 
effective for better compliance. However, firms comply with better corporate governance 
practice in the absence of mandatory obligation. Thus, the importance of regulation existence 
is irrefutable since the existence of corporate governance regulation creates pressure on the 
firms to comply. Moreover, increasing pressure is applied from peer companies who comply 
with regulation and non-compliant companies are at risk of losing investor confidence.  
The findings of objective one show firms‟ compliance increases to a significant level when 
regulation exists in the business environment. Corporate governance regulations are mostly 
„Comply or Explain‟ in New Zealand‟s institutional environment. However, the corporate 
governance index indicates that none of the companies follow full compliance with corporate 
governance regulations. Higher corporate governance index scores have significant 
relationships with corporate governance regulation, listing tenure, operating tenure and large 
shareholdings. Firm size also has a significant relationship with the corporate governance 
index; however leverage doesn‟t show any significance. This implies that voluntary regulation 
has a positive impact on compliance with regulation. Firms also practice better compliance 
with the increasing life of the business and the listing tenure of the firm. All sectors of 
business compliance have significant relationships with their corporate governance index 
except for the property and investment sector, which does not show any significant 
coefficients. The primary, energy and goods sectors show significant increases in their 
corporate governance index alongside the existence of regulations. 
The findings of objective two show higher compliance of corporate governance with 
regulation reduces discretionary accruals. Since net income (earnings) is the main indicator of 
firm performance firms‟ actions are expected to be reflected in earnings. The measure used in 
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this research, performance matched free cash flow model, shows the significance of 
explanatory variables better in comparison with other commonly used measures of 
discretionary accruals. More importantly, the performance matched free cash flow model 
shows higher compliance with corporate governance regulations reduces managerial 
discretion. Higher corporate governance compliance with regulation increases the board 
independence and accountability of decision making process. Firms operating with 
controlling shareholders indicated increased discretionary accruals. Due to higher monitoring 
of regulators and investors, firms‟ discretionary accruals reduce with listing tenure was also 
evidenced. Consistent with the first objective of this research, the property sector didn‟t show 
any impact of discretionary accruals on the performance matched free cash flow model. 
However, the primary, goods, energy and investment sectors show significant impact on 
discretionary accruals, more significant than Jones Model (1991), Modified Jones Model 
(1995) and Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals Models.  
The findings of objective three show firms‟ corporate governance compliance with regulation 
increased the firm value. Firm value was measured using the enterprise value of firm and 
compared with commonly used measure such as Tobin‟s Q and Price to Book ratio. The 
results show that higher compliance of corporate governance with regulation increase higher 
enterprise value, implying better corporate governance increases the accountability of 
management and reduces managerial opportunistic behaviour. Consequently, shareholders 
gain confidence to invest in better practiced firms. In addition, the lower level of opportunistic 
behaviour by management increases the possibility of quality information provision for 
investors. The result also shows that regulation increases firm value as investors enjoy a more 
secure investing environment. Moreover, a controlling shareholder‟s existence in a firm 
creates lower firm value as minority shareholders have lower confidence to invest. Primary, 
goods and energy sectors show higher enterprise value with higher corporate governance 
index. However, the property and investment sectors do not show any significant impact of 
governance on consequent firm value. 
5.3 Regulatory Implications 
Important regulatory implications can be drawn from these research findings. Firstly, this 
research provides holistic evidence on corporate governance compliance. The maximum value 
of corporate governance index indicates none of the companies fully complied with corporate 
governance regulations, possibly due to the „comply and explain‟ nature of New Zealand‟s 
regulation. However, the criticism that one size does not fit all can also be applied. 
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Consequently, regulators could alter the governance codes according to the business sector 
and company size. 
Secondly, regulators can impose more monitoring on the companies who exhibit lower 
corporate governance compliance. 
Thirdly, corporate governance codes and principles do not indicate the optimum size for 
board and board committees. Moreover, corporate governance regulations do not have any 
guidelines for outside directorship holdings and meeting frequency. Regulators may consider 
imposing limits on the number of outside directorships and meeting frequency requirements 
for directors. 
5.4  Contributions 
Although accounting research on corporate governance is commonly used this research 
contributes significantly in several ways. 
Firstly, this research provides evidence of the effectiveness of corporate governance 
regulation in the New Zealand institutional environment. Furthermore, while previous 
research has provided evidence of boards of directors, managerial compensation, and external 
audit fees impact on firm value or earnings management separately this research considers 
boards of director, board committees, external auditing, managerial shareholding and dual 
listing together to identify determinants of compliance in the absence of any mandatory 
obligation. Moreover, regulatory body in New Zealand will find the implication of corporate 
governance regulation through this research. Academician will be benefited by the evidence 
of earnings management and firm value affects of corporate governance in small but 
developed economic scenario such as New Zealand. 
Secondly, this is the first research in New Zealand which considered both short and long term 
consequences of corporate governance regulation. This research evidenced higher compliance 
with corporate governance regulation reduces managerial discretion in the short term and firm 
value increases as a long term effect. 
Thirdly, this research considered free cash flow as a measure of discretionary accruals and 
showed managerial discretion increases when more free cash flow exists in businesses.  
Conversely, managerial discretion on free cash flow reduces when firms comply with higher 
corporate governance practices. 
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Finally, this research established enterprise value as an indicator of firm value. In the absence 
of mandatory obligation, enterprise value reflects the true value of a firm, considering both 
free cash holdings and debts of the business. It also implies that investor confidence increases 
when firms comply with higher governance practices. 
5.5  Limitation & Future Research 
This research suffers from a few limitations which will enhance future research on the basis of 
this thesis. Those are as follows: 
Firstly, this research prepared a corporate governance index based on 70 companies which 
met the sampling criteria. Future research could be undertaken to see the effects of corporate 
governance compliance in a larger market. 
Secondly, this research did not include stock option information due to its unavailability. 
Researchers are keen to find the effectiveness and consequence of stock options in corporate 
governance and earnings management framework and the opportunity to work in a stock 
option oriented institutional environment such as the USA or Canada remains. 
Thirdly, this research considered only one institutional environment: New Zealand. It would 
be informative to compare its effectiveness of higher corporate governance compliance with 
regulation in a free cash flow model using enterprise value with other, similar countries. 
Fourthly, this research did not analyse the effect of board committees on earnings 
management and firm value. Recent researchers are keen to find the effectiveness of 
remuneration committees, nomination committees and especially audit committees. In future, 
identifying the determinants of board committees and their consequences could be a potential 
research area. 
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     Appendix A: Corporate Governance Regulations 
Country/Institution Year 
Compliance 
Nature 
National Corporate 
Governance Code 
Argentina 2001, June Voluntary 
Argentine Capital Markets 
Reform Law 
Australia 2003, March Voluntary 
Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) principles of Good 
Corporate Governance 
Austria 
2002, 
September 
Voluntary 
Austrian Code of Corporate 
Governance 
Bangladesh 2004, March Voluntary 
The Code of Corporate 
Governance for Bangladesh 
Belgium 
2004, 
December 
Voluntary 
Belgium Corporate 
Governance Code 
Brazil 2004, March Voluntary 
Code of Best Practice of 
Corporate Governance 
Bulgaria 2007, October Voluntary 
Bulgarian National Code for 
Corporate Governance 
Canada 
2003, 
December 
Voluntary 
Toronto Stock Exchange 
Guide to Good Disclosure 
China 2004, January Voluntary 
Provisional Code of Corporate 
Governance for Securities 
Companies 
Commonwealth 
1999, 
November 
Voluntary 
CACG Guidelines: Principles 
for Corporate Governance in 
Commonwealth 
Cyprus 2006, March Voluntary 
Cyprus Corporate Governance 
Code 
Czech Republic 2004, June Voluntary 
Corporate Governance Code 
based on OECD Principles 
Denmark 
2001, 
December & 
2005, August 
Voluntary 
Norby Report & 
Recommendations & The 
Revised Recommendation for 
Corporate Governance in 
Denmark 
Egypt 2006, October Voluntary 
Code of Corporate 
Governance for Private Sector 
in Egypt 
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Corporate Governance Regulations (continued) 
 
Country/Institution Year 
Compliance 
Nature 
National Corporate 
Governance Code 
Estonia  2006, January Voluntary 
Corporate Governance 
Recommendations 
Finland  
2003, 
December Voluntary 
Ministry of Trade & Industry 
Guidelines 
France  2003, October Voluntary 
The Corporate Governance of 
Listed Corporation 
Germany  
2002, 
February & 
2003, May Voluntary 
The Cromme Code & The 
Cromme Code Amendment 
Greece  2001, August Voluntary 
Federation of Greek Industries 
principles 
Hong Kong  
2004, 
November Voluntary 
Hong Kong Code of Corporate 
Governance 
Hungary  2008, March Voluntary 
Corporate Governance 
Recommendation 
Iceland  2009, June Voluntary 
Corporate Governance 
Guidelines 
India  2000, June Voluntary 
Report of the Kumar 
Mangalam Birla Committee 
on Corporate Governance 
Indonesia  2007, January Voluntary 
Code of Good Corporate 
Governance 
Ireland  1999, March Voluntary IAIM Guidelines 
Italy  2002, July Voluntary Corporate Governance Code 
Jamaica  2006, October Voluntary 
Code on Corporate 
Governance 
Japan  2001, October Voluntary 
Principles of Corporate 
Governance for Listed 
Companies 
Kenya  2002 Voluntary 
Principles for Corporate 
Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
  101  
 
 
Corporate Governance Regulations (continued) 
 
Country/Institution Year 
Compliance 
Nature 
National Corporate 
Governance Code 
Latvia  
2005, 
December Voluntary 
Principles of Corporate 
Governance and 
Recommendations on their 
Implementation 
Lebanon  2006, June Voluntary 
Corporate Governance Code 
for Small and Medium 
Enterprises 
Lithuania  2003, April Voluntary 
Corporate Governance Code 
for the Companies listed on 
the National Stock Exchange 
of Lithuania 
Luxembourg  
2009, 
September Voluntary 
The Ten Principles of 
Corporate Governance of the 
Luxembourg Stock Exchange 
Macedonia  2003, June Voluntary 
White Paper on Corporate 
Governance in South-Eastern 
Europe 
Malaysia  2007, October Voluntary 
Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance 
Malta  
2005, 
November Voluntary 
Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance 
Mexico  1999, July Voluntary 
Codigo de Mejores Practicas 
Corporativas 
Morocco  2008, March Voluntary 
Moroccan Code of Corporate 
Governance Practices 
Netherlands  2003, July Voluntary 
Dutch Corporate Governance 
Code 
Nigeria  2006, March Voluntary 
Code of Corporate Governance 
for Banks in Nigeria Post 
Consolidation 
Norway  
2007, 
December Voluntary 
The Norwegian Code of 
Practice for Corporate 
Governance 
Pakistan  2002, March Voluntary Code of Corporate Governance 
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Corporate Governance Regulations (continued) 
 
Country/Institution Year 
Compliance 
Nature 
National Corporate 
Governance Code 
Philippines  2002 Voluntary 
Code of Corporate 
Governance 
Poland  2007, July Voluntary 
Code of Best Practice for WSE 
Listed Companies 
Portugal  
2003, 
November Voluntary 
Securities Market Commission 
Recommendations 
Russia  2002, April Voluntary 
The Russian Code of 
Corporate Conduct 
Singapore  2005, July Voluntary 
Code of Corporate 
Governance 
Slovakia  2008, January Voluntary 
Corporate Governance Code 
for Slovakia 
Slovenia  
2007, 
February Voluntary Corporate Governance Code 
South Africa  2002, March Voluntary King II Report 
South Korea  
1999, 
September Voluntary 
Code of Best Practice for 
Corporate Governance 
Spain  2003, January Voluntary 
Transparency and Security 
Commission 
Sri Lanka  2006, July Voluntary 
Draft rules on Corporate 
Governance for Listed 
Companies 
Sweden  
2004, 
December Voluntary Report of the Code Group 
Switzerland  2002, June Voluntary 
Swiss Code of Best Practice 
for Corporate Governance 
Taiwan  2002, Voluntary 
Taiwan Corporate Governance 
Best Practice Principles 
Thailand  2006, March Voluntary 
The Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance for 
Listed Companies 
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Corporate Governance Regulations (continued) 
 
Country/Institution Year 
Compliance 
Nature 
National Corporate 
Governance Code 
Trinidad and Tobago  2006, May Voluntary 
Corporate Governance 
Guidelines 
Tunisia  2008, June Voluntary 
Guide de Bonnes Pratique de 
Governance des Enterprises 
Tunisiennes 
Turkey  2003, June Voluntary 
Corporate Governance 
Principles 
UK  2003, July Voluntary The Revised Combined Code 
USA  
2002, June & 
2003, April Compulsory 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act & New 
York Stock Exchange 
Corporate Governance Rules 
 
